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A B S T R A C T  
 
Civil aviation is the most regulated and likely the most competitive mode 
of transportation in the world. When commercial air transportation 
gained its economic momentum in the middle of the twentieth century, 
strong competition forced emerging airlines to find new ways to increase 
their profitability, such as optimising the utilisation of their pilots to 
reduce labour costs. 
 
As new technology allowed pilots to fly transcontinental flights for 
extended hours, government regulators in the 1960s quickly realised that 
pilot fatigue was a developing threat to the travelling public. By focusing 
on human factors in the context of flight safety, flight and duty time (FDT) 
regulations were adopted to limit the number of hours airline pilots spent 
flying and working on duty. 
 
This article will analyse the current FDT regulations in Canada. While 
many Members States of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) have modernised their FDT regulations in the last few years, 
Canada’s regulatory approach to mitigate pilot fatigue is clearly outdated. 
This article will critically evaluate the existing and potential shortcomings 
of the pilot fatigue regulations currently in force in Canada. There is a 
genuine feeling in the industry that these regulations and current laws are 
inadequate or obsolete, as they do not reflect modern pilot fatigue science 
and place smaller carriers flying in unorthodox environments at risk. 
 
R É S U M É  
 
L’aviation civile est le mode de transport le plus réglementé, et sans doute 
le plus concurrentiel au monde. Au moment où le transport aérien 
commercial connaissait son essor économique, au milieu du vingtième 
siècle, la forte concurrence a forcé les nouvelles compagnies aériennes, à 
trouver des solutions innovantes pour accroître leur rentabilité financière, 
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notamment en optimisant l’utilisation de leurs pilotes, afin de réduire les 
coûts de main-d’œuvre. 
 
Alors que les avancées technologiques permettaient aux pilotes de voler 
de nombreuses heures sur les vols transcontinentaux, les organismes de 
réglementation gouvernementaux ont rapidement réalisé, dans les années 
1960, que la fatigue des pilotes était une menace grandissante pour les 
voyageurs. En se focalisant sur les facteurs humains dans le cadre de la 
sécurité aérienne, des réglementations sur le temps de vol et de service 
(TSV) ont été adoptées pour limiter le nombre d’heures passées par les 
pilotes à voler et à travailler. 
 
Cet article analysera la réglementation actuelle en matière de TSV au 
Canada. Alors que de nombreux États membres de l’Organisation de 
l’aviation civile internationale (OACI) ont modernisé leur règlementation 
applicable au TSV, au cours des dernières années, l’approche 
réglementaire du Canada, relative à la limitation de la fatigue des pilotes, 
est manifestement dépassée. Cet article évaluera, de manière critique, les 
lacunes réelles ou potentielles des normes en vigueur au Canada, sur la 
fatigue des pilotes. Il existe un sentiment tangible, au sein de l’industrie, 
que ces règles et lois actuelles sont inappropriées et obsolètes, ne reflètent 
pas les connaissances scientifiques actuelles sur la fatigue des pilotes, et 
mettent en danger les petits exploitants aériens volant dans des 
environnements inusuels. 
 
K E Y W O R D S  
 
Pilot Fatigue; Aviation Safety; Flight Time; Duty Time; Canada; Flight 
Crew; Labour Law. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
rofessors Paul Dempsey and Laurence Gesell have stated that “[t]he 
tension existing between labor and management is probably as old 
as capitalism itself and the division of labor in society”. 1  Since 
commercial aviation operates twenty-four hours a day, every single day 
of the year, 2  air carriers have historically attempted to maximise the 
                                                 
1 Paul Stephen Dempsey & Laurence E Gesell, Airline Management: Strategies for the 21st 
Century, 3rd ed (Chandler, Ariz: Coast Aire Publications, 2012) at 583 [Dempsey & Gesell, 
Airline Management]. 
2  Temesha Evans-Davis, “Pilot Fatigue: Unresponsive Federal Aviation Regulations and 
Increasing Cockpit Technology Threaten to Rock the Nation’s Pilots to Sleep and 
Compromise Consumer Safety” (1999-2000) 65:3 J Air L & Com 567 at 579. 
P
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productivity and utilisation of their pilots at the lowest cost possible,3 with 
the adverse consequence of generating fatal accidents every now and 
then.4 Since unsafe transportation can endanger the lives of the travelling 
public worldwide, 5  the international community’s universal focus on 
elementary considerations for humanity6 has fortunately tempered this 
capitalist mentality with the adoption of air safety regulations. In light of 
this societal objective, Canada has invested considerable efforts to 
accomplish the lowest number of accidents practically achievable,7 with 
active regulatory oversight strategies to protect air safety as a universal 
necessity.8 
 
Because 90% of aviation accidents are caused by human error,9 it can 
be concluded that safety is a dynamic variable10 shaped by external factors, 
                                                 
3 Dempsey & Gesell, Airline Management, supra note 1 at 605. 
4  See generally Michael Quinlan, Ten Pathways to Death and Disaster: Learning from Fatal 
Incidents in Mines and Other High Hazard Workplaces (Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press, 
2014) at 9 (“Work remains a prominent source of death even in the wealthiest and most 
advanced industrial societies”); Richard Johnstone, “Courts, Crime, and Workplace 
Disaster” in Eric Tucker, ed, Working Disasters: The Politics of Recognition and Response 
(Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing, 2006) at 217 [Johnstone, “Courts”]; Jane Cherry, 
“Remembering How to Fly: How New Pilot Training Requirements May Do More Harm 
than Good” (2012) 77:3 J Air L & Com 537 at 544; US, National Transportation Safety Board, 
Aircraft Accident Report: Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating as Continental 
Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February 
12, 2009 (NTSB/AAR-10/01) (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2009), 
online: NTSB <www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1001.pdf>. 
See, for instance, the 2009 crash of the Colgan Air Bombardier Dash 8-Q400 (N200WQ) near 
Buffalo (New York State), where pilot fatigue was found to be a contributing factor to the 
accident, which killed 50 people (49 people on board and another person on the ground). See 
also Nick Hopkins, “Airline pilots complain of dangerous fatigue in leaked documents”, The 
Guardian (29 July 2016), online: The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/business/2016/ 
jul/29/airline-pilots-complain-dangerous-fatigue-leaked-documents-flydubai>. On another 
note, early reports based on leaked documents indicate that the Flydubai crash in Rostov 
(Russian Federation) on 19 March 2016 was likely caused by pilot fatigue and organisational 
pressure forcing air crews to work under onerous work schedules. The crash killed everyone 
on board, including 55 passengers and 7 crew. 
5 See Quinlan, supra note 4 at 5 (Quinlan concludes, “What is notable is that in transport-
related incidents the great majority of those killed were members of the travelling public 
rather than transport workers”). 
6  See Jiefang Huang, “Aviation Safety, ICAO and Obligations Erga Omnes” (2009) 8:1 
Chinese JIL 63 at 73. 
7  See generally Mikolaj Ratajczyk, “Regulatory Framework for a ‘Performance-Based’ 
Approach to Air Safety Management in the European Union” (2011) 36:6 Air & Space L 401 
at 402. 
8 Paul Stephen Dempsey & Laurence E Gesell, Air Transportation: Foundations for the 21st 
Century (Chandler, Ariz: Coast Aire Publications, 1997) at 244 [Dempsey & Gesell, Air 
Transportation]. 
9 See James Reason, “Understanding Adverse Events: Human Factors” (1995) 4:2 Quality & 
Safety in Health Care 80 at 80 [Reason, “Understanding”]. 
10 See ICAO, Safety Management Manual (SMM), 3rd ed, ICAO Doc 9859/AN/474 (Montreal: 
ICAO, 2013) at 2-1 [ICAO, SMM] (“Within the context of aviation, safety is ‘the state in which 
the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or 
below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety 
risk management.’”). 
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including political, economic, and organisational impediments.11 In this 
article, external factors refer to elements that can directly or indirectly 
influence the human performance (e.g., in-flight performance) of 
individual pilots. While economic and safety priorities have often been 
separately regulated by the State, an airline’s decision impacting safety 
will have a positive or negative effect on profitability (e.g., increased 
operating costs) and, vice versa, a business decision will in many cases 
affect air safety,12 such as the deterioration or improvement of flight crew 
performance.13 Since safety and profitability together form an indivisible 
prerequisite to ensure the sustainability of commercial air transportation, 
organisational decisions by an airline,14 such as flight crew scheduling, can 
foster either improved or inferior safety levels in the long run,15 depending 
on the latent impact of such choices.16 
 
As these external factors can induce substantial variations in pilot 
performance,17 there has been a strong focus in aviation safety to study 
human behaviour, including the adverse effects of pilot fatigue on safety.18 
Due to the demanding work and rest schedules imposed upon flight 
crews,19 pilot fatigue is a major regulatory priority in air transportation.20 
The modern duty and flight time restrictions emerged when aviation 
safety regulation progressively shifted its focus towards human factors21 in 
                                                 
11 See Reason, “Understanding”, supra note 9. 
12 Paul Stephen Dempsey, “The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board: Opening Wide 
The Floodgates of Entry” (1979-1980) 11:1 Transp LJ 91 at 167 [Dempsey, “The Rise and 
Fall”]; Australian Government, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, “Human factors”, online: 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority <www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc 
=PC_100994>. 
13 ICAO defines a flight crew member as “a licensed crew member charged with duties 
essential to the operation of an aircraft during a flight duty period’’. ICAO, (2010) 9 
International Standards and Recommended Practices: Annex 6 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation: Part 1 International Commercial Air Transport: Aeroplanes, 
Attachment A, para 4.2.1 [Annex 6]. 
14  See generally René David-Cooper, “Landing Safety Management Systems (SMS) in 
Aviation: The Implementation of Annex 19 for Commercial Air Carriers in Canada” (2015) 
XL Ann Air & Sp L 445 [David-Cooper, “Landing”]. 
15 See Quinlan, supra note 4 at 17; Natalie N DuBose, “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest 
Requirements: Does the Proposed Legislation Put to Rest the Concern Over Pilot Fatigue?” 
(2011) 76:2 J Air L & Com 253 at 256. 
16 See Reason, “Understanding”, supra note 8 at 81; Quinlan, supra note 4 at 17-18. 
17 ICAO, SMM, supra note 10 at 2-7. 
18 See Annex 6, supra note 13, ch 1. 
19 See Eileen M Gleimer, “When Less Can Be More: Fractional Ownership of Aircraft—The 
Wings of the Future” (1998-1999) 64:4 J Air L & Com 979 at 979. 
20 Quinlan, supra note 4 at 69 (“Extended hours of work and fatigue can both contribute to 
serious incidents and have long-term health effects”); Kelsey M Taylor, “Sleeping on the Job: 
A Critical Analysis of the FAA’s “Cargo Carve-out” under F.A.R. 117 and the Simple Solution 
that No One is Talking About” (2014) 79:2 J Air L & Com 401 at 403. 
21 The field of Human Factors can be defined as “the discipline concerned with optimizing 
the relationships between people and their activities through the systematic application of 
the human sciences, integrated within the framework of system engineering”. US, Federal 
Aviation Administration, “Introduction to Aviation Human Factors”, online: FAA <www. 
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the 1960s, to analyse how human dynamics could influence flight 
performance and overall safety levels.22 During this period, regulations 
were progressively introduced to optimise the working environments23 
for flight crews with the intent of providing pilots with the necessary 
“tools which take account of human strength and limitations”. 24  To 
address pilot fatigue, the field of human factors involves a 
multidisciplinary approach to safety, which aims to understand how 
humans perform in their workplace environment 25  based on “a set of 
personal, medical and biological considerations for optimal aircraft 
operations”. 26  The field of human factors, therefore, aims to develop 
enforcement policies and regulations to establish the benchmark for 
acceptable human behaviour, 27  including maximum flight and duty 
times28 for flight crews. 
 
Since fatigue constitutes a debt that can only be repaid with proper 
rest,29 Canada has adopted several domestic flight and duty time (FDT) 
regulations to address pilot fatigue. In recent years, pilot fatigue and 
contraventions to FDT regulations continue, however, to be cited in 
numerous investigations conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB).30 This phenomenon has been further exacerbated by the 
                                                 
google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKE
wisyaHDraPWAhVJ7YMKHRR1BFUQFggyMAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.faa.gov%2F
about%2Foffice_org%2Fheadquarters_offices%2Favs%2Foffices%2Faam%2Fcami%2Flibrar
y%2Fonline_libraries%2Faerospace_medicine%2Ftutorial%2Fmedia%2FII.8.1_Introduction
_to_Aviation_Human_Factors.doc&usg=AFQjCNGvCBUhX0fGGJVxlqoOGycELna46g>. 
22 ICAO, Human Factors in Air Traffic Control, Human Factors Digest No 8, Circular 241-
AN/145 (1993) at 1 [ICAO, Human Factors]. 
23 Quinlan, supra note 4 at 17. 
24 ICAO, Human Factors, supra note 22 at 1. 
25 Quinlan, supra note 4 at 17. 
26 ICAO, Fundamental Human Factors Concepts, Human Factors Digest No 1, Circular 216-
AN/131 (1989) at 2. 
27 See Richard Johnstone, “Putting the Regulated Back into Regulation”, Book Review of 
Corporate Regulation: Beyond ‘Punish or Persuade’ by Fiona Haines, (1999) 26:3 JL & Soc’y 378 
at 378-79; Johnstone, “Courts”, supra note 4 at 211. 
28 For the purpose of this article, the FDT acronym will refer to both flight time and duty time 
limitations. 
29 See Taylor, supra note 20 at 437. 
30  See e.g. Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: 
Runway Overrun: 1263343 Alberta Inc. (dba Enerjet), Boeing 737-700, C-GDEJ, Fort Nelson, British 
Columbia, 09 January 2012, A12W0004 (2012), online: Transportation Safety Board 
<www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2012/a12w0004/a12w0004.pdf>; Canada, 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Airspeed Decay – 
Uncommanded Descent: Air Canada Jazz, Bombardier CRJ 705, C-FNJZ, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 180 
nm SE, 01 August 2008, A08C0164 (2008), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc. 
ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08c0164/a08c0164.pdf>; Canada, Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Collision with Terrain: Summit Air 
Charters Ltd., Short Brothers SC-7 Skyvan C-FSDZ, Port Radium, Northwest Territories, 08 October 
2000, A00W0217 (2000), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-
reports/aviation/2000/a00w0217/a00w0217.pdf>; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Controlled Flight into Terrain: Summit Air Charters 
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modern “cockpit automation addiction”, 31  which has enabled pilots to 
endure longer transcontinental flights through several time zones, often 
with little rest.32 
 
As such, we must ask ourselves if the current regulatory framework 
in Canada for pilot fatigue and crew scheduling is sufficient to safeguard 
the well-being of air crews and the safety of passengers. A literature 
review reveals that little academic research has focused on the Canadian 
legislation in this field. The purpose of this article is to critically analyse 
the current FDT regulations in Canada. In doing so, the article will 
examine the domestic legal framework applicable to commercial air 
carriers in Canada, both from a labour and air safety point of view. One of 
the main objectives of this article is to identify any potential or 
                                                 
Limited, Dornier 228-202 C-FYEV, Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, 13 December 2008, A08W0244 
(2008), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation 
/2008/a08w0244/a08w0244.pdf>; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation 
Investigation Report: Runway Overrun: Trans States Airlines LLC, Embraer EMB-145LR N847HK, 
Ottawa/MacDonald-Cartier International Airport, Ontario, 16 June 2010, A10H0004 (2010), 
online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2010/ 
a10h0004/a10h0004.pdf>; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation 
Investigation Report: Controlled Flight into Terrain: Provincial Airlines Limited, De Havilland 
DHC-6-300 Twin Otter C-FWLQ, Davis Inlet, Newfoundland 2 nm NNE, 19 March 1999, 
A99A0036 (1999), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-
reports/aviation/1999/a99a0036/a99a0036.pdf>; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Pitch Excursion: Air Canada, Boeing 767-333, C-GHLQ, 
North Atlantic Ocean, 55°00φN 029°00φW, 14 January 2011, A11F0012 (2011), online: 
Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11 
f0012/a11f0012.pdf>; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Occurrence 
Report: Engine Power Loss/ Loss of Control: Arctic Wings and Rotors, Pilatus Britten-Norman 
BN2A-20 Islander C-GMOP, Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories 7.7 mi SE, 03 December 1993, 
A93W0204 (1993), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-rep 
orts/aviation/1993/a93w0204/a93w0204.pdf> [TSB, AOR: Engine]; Canada, Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Wake Turbulence Encounter - Collision 
with Terrain: Integra Ops Ltd. (dba Canadian Air Charters), Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain, C-GNAF, 
Richmond, British Columbia, 09 July 2009, A09P0187 (2009), online: Transportation Safety 
Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2009/a09p0187/a09p0187.pdf> 
[TSB, AIR: Wake Turbulence]; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation 
Investigation Report: Controlled Flight Into Terrain: Régionnair Inc., Raytheon Beech 1900D C-
FLIH, Sept-îles, Quebec, 12 August 1999, A99Q0151 (1999), online: Transportation Safety Board 
<www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1999/a99q0151/a99q0151.pdf>; Canada, 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Collision With Terrain: 
Northern Mountain Helicopters Inc., Bell 206B (Helicopter) C-GVQK, Bear Valley, British 
Columbia, 30 July 1997, A97P0207 (1997), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca 
/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1997/a97p0207/a97p0207.pdf>; Canada, Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Controlled Flight into Terrain: Cessna 182 
D-EDOG, Timmins, Ontario, 03 August 2001, A01O0210 (2001), online: Transportation Safety 
Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2001/a01o0210/a01o0210.pdf>; 
Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Occurrence Report: Controlled Flight 
into Terrain: Cessna 402 N67850, Wabush, Newfoundland 23 nm NW, 22 October 1995, A95Q0210 
(1995), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation 
/1995/a95q0210/a95q0210.pdf>; Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation 
Occurrence Report: Collision with Terrain: Cessna 188 Agwagon C-GYUD, Marengo, Saskatchewan 
2 mi S, 29 June 1994, A94C0119 (1994), online: Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/ 
eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1994/a94c0119/a94c0119.pdf>. 
31 See Cherry, supra note 4 at 567. 
32 See Evans-Davis, supra note 2. 
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demonstrated shortcomings within the Canadian legislation and reveal 
any notable differences with international aviation standards. In addition, 
possible improvements to the current regulations will be suggested. This 
article’s methodological approach will adopt a multidisciplinary analysis 
of TSB accident investigation reports, human factors, and legal sources in 
relation with FDT regulations. 
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 
ORGANIZATION’S FDT STANDARDS AND 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
 
Before commencing an in-depth analysis of the FDT regulations, we 
must identify Canada’s international legal obligations as a Member State 
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). With 191 existing 
Member States,33 ICAO is the United Nations’ (UN) specialised agency 
responsible for ensuring “the safe and orderly growth of international civil 
aviation throughout the world” 34  and promoting “safety of flight in 
international air navigation’’. 35  ICAO’s Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPs) comprehensively address technical and regulatory 
aviation issues, such as international operating standards, air routes and 
communications, aircraft licensing and airworthiness certification, aircraft 
registration, etc.36 By exercising its quasi-legislative powers,37 the ICAO 
Council adopted a wide variety of SARPs to improve air safety over the 
last seventy years,38 which were incorporated into several Annexes to the 
Chicago Convention.39 
 
To address pilot fatigue, ICAO originally introduced FDT SARPs 
into Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.40 While ICAO SARPs only apply 
to international air transport operations, Annex 6 serves as an 
authoritative guidance for countries wishing to mitigate pilot fatigue in 
                                                 
33 ICAO, “Member States” (7 October 2016), online: ICAO <www.icao.int/MemberStates/ 
Member%20States.English.pdf>. 
34  Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295, ICAO Doc 
7300/9, art 44(a) (entered into force 4 April 1947) [Chicago Convention]. 
35 Ibid, art 44(h). 
36 Laurence E Gesell & Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation and the Law, 4th ed (Chandler, Ariz: 
Coast Aire Publications, 2005) at 881-82 [Gesell & Dempsey, Aviation]. 
37 Ibid at 881. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Public International Air Law (Montreal: McGill University, Institute 
and Centre for Research in Air & Space Law, 2008) at 75 [Dempsey, Public]. 
40 See Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.2.1 (“Flight time, flight duty period, duty 
period limitations and rest requirements are established for the sole purpose of ensuring that 
the flight crew and the cabin crew members are performing at an adequate level of alertness 
for safe flight operations”). 
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both domestic and international sectors of their civil aviation industry. In 
Canada, there is no distinction between domestic and international flight 
operations for FDT regulations, which stem from Annex 6. This illustrates 
how Annex 6 seems to remain the benchmark for FDT regulations in both 
domestic and international sectors of the Canadian aviation industry. 
 
Under Annex 6, ICAO Member States are required to effectively 
regulate and manage pilot fatigue with the implementation of adequate 
regulations and government oversight. 41  They are also required to 
prescribe daily, monthly, and yearly FDT limitations taking into account 
transient fatigue,42 cumulative fatigue,43 and circadian fatigue.44 Since many 
countries enjoy unique aviation cultures and have adopted different 
scientific and legal standpoints in the field of human factors,45 Annex 6 
does not contain any compulsory hour-specific or numerical FDT 
regulations.46 Hence, several States possess different numeric restrictions 
within their domestic laws regarding the specific number of hours a pilot 
may fly and be on duty,47 although FDT regulations are often comparable 
from one country to another. 
 
ICAO Member States have an affirmative obligation to keep their 
domestic regulations uniform with the SARPs, including those under 
Annex 6.48 However, if a State cannot comply with ICAO’s SARPs, it must 
provide an immediate notification to ICAO 49  under Article 38 of the 
Chicago Convention.50 Since SARPs are not part of the Convention per se,51 
                                                 
41 Ibid, Attachment A, para 1.1. 
42  Ibid, Attachment A, para 1.2 (“Transient fatigue may be described as fatigue that is 
dispelled by a single sufficient period of rest or sleep”). 
43 Ibid, Attachment A, para 1.2 (“Cumulative fatigue occurs after incomplete recovery from 
transient fatigue over a period of time”). 
44 Taylor, supra note 20 at 404 (“Circadian fatigue occurs when an individual experiences 
diminished performance during a time when the body normally wants to be asleep (i.e., the 
“window of circadian low”), which for most people is between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.”). 
45 See DuBose, supra note 15 at 272. 
46 Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.1.3, provides: 
When deciding what numerical values should be inserted, States should take into 
account the results of relevant scientific principles and knowledge, past experience 
in administering such regulations, cultural issues and the nature of operations 
intended to be undertaken. 
47 See Canada, Transport Canada, Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council (CARAC) 
Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA): Flight Crew Fatigue Management, CARAC Activity 
Reporting Notice 2014-019 (15 September 2014) at 5 [Transport Canada, Flight]. 
48 Chicago Convention, supra note 34, art 12; Paul Stephen Dempsey & Laurence E Gesell, 
Public Policy and the Regulation of Commercial Aviation (Chandler, Ariz: Coast Aire 
Publications, 2013) at 692 [Dempsey & Gesell, Public Policy]; Dempsey, Public, supra note 39 
at 72. 
49 Dempsey, Public, supra note 39 at 77. 
50 Chicago Convention, supra note 34, art 38. 
51  “Under the Chicago Convention, SARPs may be adopted by two thirds of the ICAO 
Council, which is itself comprised of only thirty six member states. Thus, twenty four 
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they are “soft law” 52  and are not subject to the international law of 
treaties.53 As a result, they may not be binding on a State, which notifies 
ICAO of its non-compliance with a specific Annex 6 standard.54 It follows 
that, unless and until a State adopts domestic laws incorporating ICAO’s 
SARPs, FDT regulations found in Annex 6 will not impose any legal 
obligations on airlines.55 
 
It appears that Canada is a delinquent country in the field of pilot 
fatigue, since it has not fully implemented all the FDT Standards contained 
in Annex 6. In support of this claim, we must note that, in 2009, ICAO 
amended Annex 6, requiring its Member States to introduce Fatigue Risk 
Management Systems (FRMS) 56  within their regulatory framework. 57 
While an analysis of FRMS rules does not fall within the research scope of 
this article,58 it is worth noting that Canada has yet to enact its own FRMS 
regulations reflecting modern fatigue science and is falling behind many 
countries in this regard.59 Since Canada has not officially notified ICAO of 
differences regarding its non-compliance with this recent amendment,60 
all FRMS and FDT SARPs are binding upon Canada 61  and, as such, 
                                                 
member states less than 13% of the [191] member ICAO Assembly can promulgate a SARP”. 
Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Compliance & Enforcement in International Law: Achieving Global 
Uniformity in Aviation Safety” (2004) 30:1 NCJ Intl L & Com Reg 1 at 62 [Dempsey, 
“Compliance”]. 
52 Dempsey, Public, supra note 39 at 175; David-Cooper, “Landing”, supra note 14 at 473. 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 
January 1980). 
54 Dempsey & Gesell, Public Policy, supra note 48 at 691. 
55 See Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO in Marietta Benkö, ed, Essential Air and 
Space Law, vol 4 (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2008) at 159; Md Tanveer Ahmad, 
Adapting the Existing Regime for the Contemporary World to Achieve Global Civil Aviation Safety: 
A Developing Country Perspective (LLM Thesis, McGill University Institute of Air and Space 
Law, 2009) at 14 [unpublished]. 
56 FRMS is defined as 
A data-driven means of continuously monitoring and managing fatigue-related 
safety risks, based upon scientific principles and knowledge as well as operational 
experience that aims to ensure relevant personnel are performing at adequate levels 
of alertness. 
Annex 6, supra note 13, ch 1. See also Taylor, supra note 20 at 411. 
57 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 5. 
58  The International Air Transport Association (IATA), ICAO and the International 
Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) developed an exhaustive guide 
explaining FRMS and detailing the implementation of this regulatory framework in civil 
aviation. See IATA, ICAO & IFALPA, Fatigue Risk Management Systems: Implementation Guide 
for Operators, 1st ed (July 2011), online: ICAO <www.icao.int/safety/fatiguemanagement 
/FRMS%20Tools/FRMS%20Implementation%20Guide%20for%20Operators%20July%2020
11.pdf>. 
59 The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, the European Aviation Safety Agency, 
and even India have implemented FRMS in their respective civil aviation industries. See 
Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 5. 
60 Any difference with the SARPs should be immediately notified to ICAO. See Chicago 
Convention, supra note 34, art 38. 
61 Dempsey, Public, supra note 39 at 77 (Without a notification of compliance, there is a 
“presumption of compliance, and arguably, binding applicability”). 
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Canada is presently in violation of its international air law obligations.62 
 
As demonstrated in Table 1 below, Canada’s weekly and monthly 
FDT limitations are currently inadequate compared to similar regulations 
found in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, the 
European Union (EU) member States, and India. The Canadian FDT 
regulations also do not specifically address night operations with more 
restrictive limits,63 even though Canada is now required to do so under 
Annex 6.64 It can, therefore, be concluded that Canada has outdated FDT 
regulations. Hence, it is argued that Canada should conduct a major 
overhaul of its air safety regulations to avoid any legal or political issues. 
Since ICAO Member States must adhere to the same set of norms, 65 a 
country’s failure to comply with FDT and FRMS SARPs could, in theory, 
result in other States refusing the entry of air carriers registered in that 
delinquent country.66 SARPs, therefore, “appear to have corresponding de 
facto ‘hard law’ attributes as well”,67 as there seem to exist strong legal, 
political, and economic imperatives persuading Canada to update its 
current domestic FDT laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Gesell & Dempsey, Aviation, supra note 36 at 881. 
63 DuBose, supra note 15 at 265. Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 4, notes: 
The current requirements do not restrict the number of consecutive night duties that 
may be flown. The science shows that there is an exponential increase in risk over 
successive nights. When compared to the first night, the risk is 6% higher on the 
second night, 17% higher on the third night and 36% higher on the fourth night. 
There is already a 30% increase in relative risk when a night duty is compared to a 
day duty (8 am start). This risk compounds over successive nights – a significant 
decrease in performance. 
64 See Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.8.1.1. 
65 Chicago Convention, supra note 34, arts 37, 38. 
66 Gesell & Dempsey, Aviation, supra note 36 at 79, assert: 
When economically powerful States, such as the United States or the European 
Union, blacklist a nation’s carriers, the economic impact can be severe. Under such 
circumstances, private sector insurance coverage for airlines and airports may be 
impossible to obtain. Moreover, the delinquent government would be responsible 
and arguably liable, should an aircraft collision or other aviation tragedy occur, the 
proximate cause of which was the failure of the government to comply with a 
relevant SARP. 
See also Dempsey & Gesell, Public Policy, supra note 48 at 284; Md Tanveer Ahmad, Climate 
Change Governance in International Civil Aviation: Toward Regulating Emissions Relevant to 
Climate Change and Global Warming in Marietta Benkö, ed, Essential Air and Space Law, vol 
17 (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2016) at 63; Dempsey, “Compliance”, supra 
note 51 at 132-33; Chicago Convention, supra note 34. This could be achieved by another 
country blacklisting some or all Canadian carriers from its airspace or by terminating any 
current bilateral transport treaties between both reciprocal countries. 
67 Dempsey, Public, supra note 39 at 80. 
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Table 1: FDT Regulations in Different Countries 
 
 
Source: Transport Canada68 
 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMERCIAL 
AIR OPERATORS IN CANADA 
 
A. THE AERONAUTICS ACT AND THE CANADIAN 
AVIATION REGULATIONS 
 
Under the Aeronautics Act of Canada,69 the Minister of Transport 
holds plenary jurisdiction over its federal government department, 
Transport Canada,70 regarding the development of civil aviation safety 
regulations.71 With its primary mission of ensuring safe air transport for 
the travelling public,72 Transport Canada is responsible for promoting and 
developing safety in the Canadian national civil aviation network with 
adequate regulatory infrastructure and effective oversight over the 
commercial aviation industry. 73  As such, Transport Canada’s 
                                                 
68 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 5. USA refers to the United States, EASA refers 
to the European Aviation Safety Agency responsible for promulgating aviation safety rules 
in the EU, UK refers to the United Kingdom, and CASA refers to the Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) responsible for promulgating air safety rules in Australia. While India 
possessed, at the time of this writing, a Category 1 rating under the FAA’s International 
Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) programme, it has experienced a troubled safety record 
in the past and had a Category 2 safety record banning Indian airlines from increasing their 
flights to the US until 2015. See US, Federal Aviation Administration, Press Release, “U.S. 
Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces Improved Aviation Safety Rating for India” (8 
April 2015), online: US FAA <www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId 
=18575>. 
69 Aeronautics Act, RSC 1985, c A-2 [Aeronautics Act]. 
70 See Dempsey, “The Rise and Fall”, supra note 12 at 285 (in reference to the US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA)). 
71 Aeronautics Act, supra note 69, s 4.2(1). 
72 See Dempsey & Gesell, Air Transportation, supra note 8 at 188; Gesell & Dempsey, Aviation, 
supra note 36 at 286. 
73 See Transport Canada, “Civil Aviation”, online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/eng/ 
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“responsibilities for maintaining public safety in its use of the national 
airspace are extensive”. 74  In reaction to pilot fatigue concerns, FDT 
restrictions for professional pilots have been federally regulated in 
Canada since the 1940s,75 and are now firmly established in the Canadian 
Aviation Regulations (CARs), 76  which comprehensively support every 
other aspect of aviation safety. 77  In light of this safety imperative, 
Transport Canada has the necessary jurisdiction to periodically prescribe 
and revise “reasonable rules and regulations governing the maximum 
hours or periods of service airmen”, 78  such as FDT regulations. The 
Occupational Health and Safety Tribunal of Canada (OHSTC) stated in the 
recent Black Sheep Aviation79 decision that “limitations standards to flying 
and duty time is a preventive measure designed to ensure that pilots are 
not called upon to fly in a condition of excessive fatigue”.80 
 
In the Canadian air commerce industry,81 FDT restrictions apply to 
aerial work operators (“702 carriers”), 82  air taxi operators (“703 
                                                 
civilaviation/menu.htm>. 
74 Gesell & Dempsey, Aviation, supra note 36 at 287. 
75 Sarah Schmidt, “Pilots question Transport Canada’s stance on new fatigue guidelines”, 
Canwest News Service, online: Air Canada Component of the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (CUPE) <www.accomponent.ca/en/news/pilots-question-transport-canadas-
stance-new-fatigue-guidelines>. 
76 Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433 [Canadian Aviation Regulations]. 
77 Gesell & Dempsey, Aviation, supra note 36 at 301. 
78 Ibid at 379. 
79 Black Sheep Aviation & Cattle Co Ltd (2015), 2015 OHSTC 9 (Occupational Health and Safety 
Tribunal Canada), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/occupational-
health-and-safety-tribunal-canada/programs/decisions/2015/ohstc-2015-009.html> [Black 
Sheep Aviation]. On 31 March 2011, a de Havilland DHC-3 Otter operated by Black Sheep 
Aviation & Cattle Co. Ltd. departed from Mayo (Yukon) to deliver mining supplies to a client 
and crashed 19 minutes after departure following a catastrophic in-flight breakup. The pilot, 
the sole occupant in the aircraft, was fatally injured. Among other findings, the investigation 
determined that the pilot had deliberately made erroneous entries in journey logs. This was 
likely to circumvent FDT limits and aircraft maintenance schedules. It was found that, by 
exceeding the maximum duty time permitted by the CARs during a 7-day period, the pilot’s 
conduct had increased the risk of fatigue. It was also found that company procedures to 
monitor FDT compliance were lacking. While the accident was not caused by pilot fatigue 
per se, the investigation revealed serious issues regarding the industry’s imperfect 
compliance with FDT regulations and the potential for pilot fatigue. 
80 Ibid at para 34. 
81 Dempsey & Gesell, Air Transportation, supra note 8 at 223 (“Air commerce is the carriage of 
persons or property for compensation or hire, or the carriage of mail by aircraft, or the 
operation or navigation of aircraft in the conduct of furtherance of a business or vocation”. 
Air commerce therefore excludes any State or military aircraft operations). 
82 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 702.01(1), defines an aerial work operation 
as: 
 the operation of an aeroplane or helicopter in aerial work involving: 
 (a) the carriage on board of persons other than flight crew members; 
 (b) the carriage of helicopter Class B, C or D external loads; 
 (c) the towing of objects; or 
 (d) the dispersal of products. 
The “operation of an ultra-light aeroplane, or in respect of the operation of an aircraft in 
aerial work involving sightseeing operations” is not considered as an aerial work operation. 
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carriers”), 83  commuter operators (“704 carriers”), 84  and airlines (“705 
carriers”)85 registered in Canada. In the aviation industry, 702, 703, and 
704 operators are commonly referred to as “small operators” or “small 
carriers”, 86  while 705 carriers are referred to as “airlines” or “large 
carriers”.87 As we shall see, FDT limitations will often differ depending on 
the category of operator. It is important to note, however, that FDT 
restrictions do not apply to flight training units (FTUs),88 meaning that, in 
practice, no regulations in the CARs currently prevent flight instructors 
from working or flying beyond reasonable duty hours.89 
                                                 
Ibid, s 702.01(2). 
83 Ibid, s 703.01, defines an air taxi operator as: 
a Canadian air operator, in an air transport service or in aerial work involving 
sightseeing operations, of any of the following aircraft: 
 (a) a single-engined aircraft; 
(b) a multi-engined aircraft, other than a turbo-jet-powered aeroplane, that has a 
MCTOW of 8 618 kg (19,000 pounds) or less and a seating configuration, excluding 
pilot seats, of nine or less; 
(b.1) a multi-engined helicopter certified for operation by one pilot and operated 
under VFR; and 
 (c) any aircraft that is authorized by the Minister to be operated under this Subpart. 
Ibid, s 101.01(1) provides: “MCTOW or maximum certificated take-off weight means the 
weight identified as such in the type certificate of an aircraft”. 
84 Ibid, s 704.01, defines commuter operator as: 
a Canadian air operator, in an air transport service or in aerial work involving 
sightseeing operations, of any of the following aircraft: 
(a) a multi-engined aeroplane that has a MCTOW of 8 618 kg (19,000 pounds) or less 
and a seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, of 10 to 19 inclusive; 
(b) a turbo-jet-powered aeroplane that has a maximum zero fuel weight of 22 680 kg 
(50,000 pounds) or less and for which a Canadian type certificate has been issued 
authorizing the transport of not more than 19 passengers; 
(b.1) a multi-engined helicopter with a seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, 
of 10 to 19 inclusive, unless it is certified for operation with one pilot and operated 
under VFR; and 
 (c) any aircraft that is authorized by the Minister to be operated under this Subpart. 
85 Ibid, s 705.01, defines an airline operator as:  
a Canadian air operator, in an air transport service or in aerial work involving 
sightseeing operations, of any of the following aircraft: 
(a) an aeroplane, other than an aeroplane authorized to operate under Subpart 4, that 
has a MCTOW of more than 8 618 kg (19,000 pounds) or for which a Canadian type 
certificate has been issued authorizing the transport of 20 or more passengers; 
 (b) a helicopter that has a seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, of 20 or more; 
or 
 (c) any aircraft that is authorized by the Minister to be operated under this Subpart. 
86 Transport Canada, Safety Management Systems for Small Aviation Operations: A Practical 
Guide to Implementation, TC-1001017, TP 14135E (09/2004) (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 2004) 
at 1, online: Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/T52-4-7-
2004E.pdf>. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Flight training unit means: 
(a) in the case of an aeroplane or helicopter, the holder of a flight training unit 
operator certificate, or 
(b) in the case of a glider, balloon, gyroplane or ultra-light aeroplane, a club, school 
or other organization that conducts flight training[.] 
Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 101.01(1). 
89 As discussed below, flight instructors employed by a flight training unit (FTU) would be 
covered under the Canada Labour Code and are, therefore, subject to daily and weekly 
maximum working hours. 
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B. THE UPCOMING LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF FDT 
REGULATIONS IN CANADA 
 
While current FDT restrictions are designed to mitigate pilot 
fatigue, the existing regulations have not been amended in over twenty 
years. 90  Therefore, current FDT limits are, in some regards, obsolete. 
Transport Canada has even openly admitted that “the current limitations 
are not supported by today’s fatigue science and are not meeting ICAO’s 
SARPs”.91 Even in the opinion of Transport Canada, current regulations 
permit duty times that are too long, tolerate rest periods that are too short, 
and do not take into account human physiology, circadian cycles,92 and 
the effects of accumulated pilot fatigue.93 
 
In response to this apparent threat to flight safety, a Transport 
Canada working group published a report in 2012, resting on industry, 
legal, and scientific expertise. 94  Based on this report, the Canadian 
Aviation Regulation Advisory Council (CARAC) of Transport Canada 
released in 2014 a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA)95 to outline its 
suggested amendments to the CARs in an attempt to harmonise the 
Canadian legislation with international air safety standards96 – an implicit 
recognition that the CARs do not meet international standards. The 
general objective of this regulatory overhaul is to reduce fatigue-related 
human errors and improve the overall air safety standards in Canada.97 
This article will occasionally refer to the suggested amendments contained 
in the NPA to compare them with the existing CARs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 FDT regulations in Canada were developed by a government working group in the early 
1990s and were originally adopted in 1996. See Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 1. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See also Quinlan, supra note 4 at 70, 117. 
93 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 1. 
94  Captain Dan Adamus & Jacqueline Booth, Report of the Canadian Aviation Regulation 
Advisory Council (CARAC) Flight Crew Fatigue Management Working Group (Transport Canada, 
15 August 2012), online: Transport Canada <wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/npa-apm/ 
doc.aspx?id=10019>. 
95 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47. Proposed regulatory amendments were published 
in the Canada Gazette in July 2017. At the time of this writing, these had not yet been 
adopted. 
96 Ibid at 2. 
97 Ibid at 1. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the most important pilot union in North 
America, stated that the NPA’s modernisation of flight and duty time rules “marks a 
significant step forward in advancing ALPA’s goals for combating pilot fatigue and further 
improving air safety throughout Canada”. “ALPA Hails Government Action to Update 
Canadian Pilot Fatigue Rules”, Cision (15 September 2014), online: Cision <www.newswire. 
ca/news-releases/alpa-hails-government-action-to-update-canadian-pilot-fatigue-rules-515 
626661.html>. 
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C. COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AND THE 
CANADA LABOUR CODE 
 
While it is often ignored by some air operators, the Canada Labour 
Code98 applies to pilots, since air transportation is a federal industry 99 
under the exclusive legislative purview of the Parliament of Canada.100 
However, the Labour Code only applies to pilots employed by an air 
operator 101  and to dependent air contractors. 102  Independent contractor 
pilots, who generally represent a minority in modern-day commercial 
aviation,103 are not covered by the Labour Code and must abide by FDT 
                                                 
98 Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2 [Labour Code]. 
99 Ibid, s 2, provides: 
In this Act, federal work, undertaking or business means any work, undertaking or 
business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament, including, without 
restricting the generality of the foregoing, 
 … 
 (e) aerodromes, aircraft or a line of air transportation[.] 
100  Constitutional case law in Canada has held for nearly a century that the federal 
government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate aviation. See In re the Regulation and Control 
of Aeronautics in Canada, [1931] JCJ  No 4, [1932] AC 54, [1932] 1 DLR 58 (UK); Johannesson v 
West St. Paul (Rural Municipality of), [1952] 1 SCR 292; Air Canada v Ontario (Liquor Control 
Board), [1997] 2 SCR 581. In Quebec (Attorney General) v Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, 
2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 SCR 536 at para 28, the court stated: 
The jurisprudence establishes that Parliament has power over aeronautics. Because 
commercial aviation was not foreseen in 1867, aviation is not articulated as a head of 
power under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, it has been held to be a 
matter of national importance and hence supported under the federal POGG power. 
The court, ibid at para 29, further noted: “The matter was settled in 1951 in Johannesson v 
Rural Municipality of West St. Paul … In five separate opinions, the Supreme Court of 
Canada unanimously held that Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the field of 
aviation, confirming earlier dicta that aerial navigation is a matter of national interest and 
importance: In re Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54 (P.C.)”. 
101 Labour Code, supra note 98, s 3(1) provides: 
employee means any person employed by an employer and includes a dependent 
contractor and a private constable, but does not include a person who performs 
management functions or is employed in a confidential capacity in matters relating 
to industrial relations[.] 
102 Ibid. Under the Labour Code, ibid, s 3(1), a “dependent contractor” means: 
(a) the owner, purchaser or lessee of a vehicle used for hauling, other than on rails or 
tracks, livestock, liquids, goods, merchandise or other materials, who is a party to a 
contract, oral or in writing, under the terms of which they are 
(i) required to provide the vehicle by means of which they perform the contract 
and to operate the vehicle in accordance with the contract, and 
(ii) entitled to retain for their own use from time to time any sum of money that 
remains after the cost of their performance of the contract is deducted from the 
amount they are paid, in accordance with the contract, for that performance, 
 (b) … 
(c) any other person who, whether or not employed under a contract of employment, 
performs work or services for another person on such terms and conditions that they 
are, in relation to that other person, in a position of economic dependence on, and 
under an obligation to perform duties for, that other person[.] 
103  Although self-employed pilots were more common in the early days of commercial 
operations in Canada, very few pilots still conduct freelance flight operations, mainly 
because of the increasingly high fixed costs associated with owning an air transportation 
company. A minority of freelance pilots, such as independent flight instructors, crop-duster 
pilots, tour guide operators or air taxi pilots, still operate as independent contractors not 
2016 PROTECTING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF PILOTS 97 
regulations found in the CARs. For pilots covered by the Labour Code, the 
standard hours of work are 8 hours in any period of 24 consecutive hours 
and 40 hours in any period of 7 consecutive days.104 Both these standards 
do not set any absolute limit; they can be exceeded if the employer meets 
certain criteria, namely by providing overtime compensation in some 
circumstances. 
 
Since the aviation industry possesses an irregular and seasonal 
distribution of working hours, the Labour Code also allows pilots to 
average their standard weekly 40-hour limit over a period of two or more 
weeks under certain conditions upon their employer posting a notice to 
this effect to the attention of its employees.105 This notice permits pilots to 
fly beyond the standard work schedule during a specific timeframe (e.g., 
during peak business periods). 
 
Generally, employers cannot require their pilots to be on duty 
beyond 48 hours in a single week.106 A carrier can, nonetheless, derogate 
from this limit if the average hours of work for a period of two or more 
weeks do not exceed 48 hours a week. However, this derogation must be 
agreed upon in writing by the employer and the trade union for 
employees subject to a collective agreement, or conversely, by 70% of its 
non-unionised employees.107 An employer can also go beyond the weekly 
48-hour limit if the air carrier obtains a ministerial permit exemption;108 if 
regulations adopted by the Governor in Council expressly derogate from 
the standard limit;109 or when a carrier conducts emergency work,110 such 
as aerial rescue or firefighting operations, for example. Hence, the Labour 
Code does permit pilots to fly well beyond the 40-hour standard in many 
circumstances. 
 
                                                 
covered by the Labour Code, supra note 98. 
104 Labour Code, supra note 98, s 169(1). 
105 Ibid, s 169(2). Canada Labour Standards Regulations, CRC, c 986, s 6(1) [Labour Regulations], 
provides: 
Where the nature of the work in an industrial establishment necessitates that the 
hours of work of certain employees be irregularly distributed with the result that 
those employees 
  (a) have no regularly scheduled daily or weekly hours of work, or 
  (b) have regularly scheduled hours of work that vary in number from time to time, 
the hours of work of each of those employees in a day and in a week may be 
calculated as an average over an averaging period of two or more consecutive weeks. 
106 Labour Code, supra note 98, s 171(1). Therefore, a pilot may fly beyond the daily 8-hour 
limit and weekly 40-hour limit as long as any exceeding time is respectively compensated 
with a salary equal to 1.5 times the usual wage. 
107 Ibid, s 172. 
108 Ibid, s 176(1). 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid, s 177(1). 
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Transport Canada has admitted that “current regulations do not 
have cumulative duty limitations” for pilots.111 As such, the regulatory 
flight time limitations found in the CARs (a maximum of 60 flight hours 
in some cases, as discussed below) can result in legally permissible duty 
hours of up to 60 to 90 hours per week.112 Therefore, the Labour Code’s 
standard work schedule may often clash with the maximum duty time 
permissible by the CARs for pilots employed by a carrier,113 unless an 
employer manages to benefit from an exception in certain circumstances 
set out by the Labour Code and the Labour Standards Regulations.114 As 
illustrated in Table 2 below, the CARs are, on a weekly basis, far more 
permissible than the Labour Code’s standard working hours. In many 
situations, the CARs enable pilots, excluding flight instructors,115 to work 
well beyond the Labour Code’s standard work schedule. 
 
Table 2: Standard Hours of Work under the Canada Labour Code Versus 
Maximum Pilot Duty Times Permitted in the CARs 
 
Canadian Law Maximum Duty Time 
Within 24 hours Within 7 days Within 2 weeks 
Canada Labour 
Code 
No maximum per 
se – Overtime 
compensation 
may apply after 8 
hours 
Generally, 40 
hours. 
The limit can be 
extended if certain 
criteria are met 
Generally, 80 
hours. 
The limit can be 
extended if certain 
criteria are met 
Canadian 
Aviation 
Regulations 
14 hours 60 to 90 hours 
(depending on the 
type of operator), 
which result from 
the maximum 
flight time 
allowed in the 
CARs 
120 to 180 hours 
(depending on the 
type of operator), 
which result from 
the maximum 
flight time 
allowed in the 
CARs 
 
                                                 
111 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 3. The US, the UK, Australia, and even India 
have regulated weekly duty time limits for pilots in the range of 55 to 60 hours a week. 
112 Ibid at 4. 
113 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.01, provides: 
employed on a full-time basis means working for an air operator on a continuous 
basis for at least the number of hours required to carry out the duties of the position 
for the safe operation of the commercial air service[.] 
114 For employers seeking to adopt a modified work schedule or implement the averaging of 
employee work hours, which both exceed the normal work schedule of the Labour Code, see 
Labour Regulations, supra note 105, ss 4, 5, 6. 
115 Since flight instructors are not covered by FDT regulations in the CARs, we can conclude 
that working time limitations for flight instructors employed by an FTU are exclusively 
governed by the Labour Code. On the other hand, self-employed flight instructors, being 
considered as independent contractors, would not be covered by the Labour Code, nor by 
the CARs either. There is, therefore, a regulatory vacuum for FDT limitations for freelance 
instructors, as these pilots can work and fly as many hours as they wish. 
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The Labour Code is ultimately more restrictive than the CARs when 
an employee averages his or her weekly work hours over an extended 
period of time. If we conceive a hypothetical scenario in the higher ranges 
where a person is capable of working up to 45 to 50 weeks in one year, a 
pilot who averages his or her work hours with a weekly average of 48 
hours on duty would still be entitled to work between 2160 and 2400 hours 
a year under the Labour Code. If that same pilot reaches the maximum 
flight time allowed annually under the CARs, which is 1200 hours,116 it is 
quite unlikely that this pilot would breach the Labour Code given 
Transport Canada’s approximate computation of duty time in relation to 
actual flight time, which roughly equates to three hours of total duty time 
for every two hours of flight time.117 
 
Overall, while most large airlines have reasonable collective 
bargaining agreements that utilise their pilots within the legal limits 
established by the Labour Code and the CARs with respect to maximum 
working hours, smaller cash-strapped operators are, nonetheless, likely to 
utilise their pilots near the upper duty time limits, with a deleterious effect 
on flight performance. 
 
IV. MONITORING SYSTEMS 
 
To achieve a delicate balance between legal and business 
imperatives, commercial air operators are legally required to have an 
organised tracking system to monitor FDT limits for every employed 
pilot. 118  In fact, it is a requirement under Annex 6 to regularly and 
accurately log all flight and duty times.119 A company must also openly 
communicate in their company operations manual information regarding 
the procedures in place to monitor FDT limitations for flight crews.120 In 
                                                 
116 See Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76. 
117 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 3. Calculations are based on weekly flight time 
limits (40-60 flight hours depending on the type of operator). Hence, a pilot who accumulates 
1200 hours of flight time is likely to be on duty for 1800 hours that same year. 
118 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.14(1). 
119 See relevant guidance in Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, paras 4.11.1, 4.11.2: 
4.11.1 To enable the operator to ascertain that the fatigue management scheme is 
functioning as intended and as approved, records should be kept for (*) months of 
the duties performed and rest periods achieved so as to facilitate inspection by the 
operator’s authorized personnel and audit by the State of the Operator. 
 
4.11.2 The operator should ensure that these records include for each flight and cabin 
crew member, at least: 
  a) the start, duration and end of each flight duty period; 
  b) the start, duration and end of each duty period; 
  c) rest periods; and 
  d) flight time. 
120 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.14(1). 
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practice, technology has enabled carriers to efficiently monitor these time 
restrictions by utilising computerised programmes, which automatically 
alert managers when a flight assignment has the potential of exceeding the 
FDT limits.121 Pilots also have a legal obligation to notify their employer 
when a flight assignment may exceed the maximum FDT restrictions.122 
Pilots are responsible for recording their flight times in a personal 
logbook123 and must, therefore, conduct an individual assessment on a 
regular basis to determine whether they are working within the regulatory 
duty time limits.124 
 
The TSB has stated that an employer and his or her pilots should 
proactively monitor FDT compliance on a daily basis. 125  Although 
compliance with FDT regulations is a joint responsibility shared by both 
the employer and his or her pilots,126 the OHSTC has asserted that pilots 
are ultimately responsible for regularly and accurately logging their 
hours.127 This is an odd conclusion, since carriers are partly responsible for 
the safety and well-being of their aircrew. In light of the existing 
organisational pressures imposed on the average professional pilot, the 
burden of ensuring compliance with safety regulations should lie with the 
carrier,128 not with pilots at risk of being pressured by management to take 
on more flight assignments. An opposite conclusion would condone 
turning a blind eye to ongoing violations by an employer’s pilots and 
                                                 
121 See Black Sheep Aviation, supra note 79. 
122 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.14(2). 
123  The holder of a pilot licence is required under law to maintain a personal log book 
containing a record of all flights conducted by the pilot to evaluate his or her flight 
experience. This log must contain, for example, the specific dates when flights were 
conducted, the total flight time, and the type of flight conditions with respect to day, night, 
visual flight rules (VFR), and instrument flight rules (IFR). Ibid, s 401.08. 
124 See Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.11.4. 
125  Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report: Loss of 
control – In-flight breakup: Black Sheep Aviation & Cattle Co. Ltd., de Havilland DHC-3 Otter C-
GMCW, Mayo, Yukon, 38 nm NE, 31 March 2011, A11W0048 (2011) at 33, online: 
Transportation Safety Board <www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11w0 
048/a11w0048.pdf> [TSB, AIR: Black Sheep]. 
126 Ibid at 30. 
127 Black Sheep Aviation, supra note 79 at para 31:  
It seems clear to me that requiring the employer to verify the entries made by their 
employees is not supported by the wording of the Manual. Employees are, pursuant 
to section 126 of the Code, required to fulfill their obligations regarding matters of 
health and safety. The Manual clearly places the responsibility of accurately 
reporting flight hours in the log book, on the employees. I note that those hours 
include flight time for the appellant, but also with other operators or private flying. 
Requiring the employer to ensure the accuracy of all entries, including the latter, 
would imply some kind of independent investigation into the actual flying time of 
the pilots, which is not in my view a reasonable interpretation of the Manual. In my 
view, if that was the intended result, the wording of the section should have so 
expressed more clearly. 
128  Johnstone, “Courts”, supra note 4 at 219 (In reality, “the alleged carelessness of the 
employee has very little to do with the offense of failing to provide a safe workplace”). 
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encourage “blame-shifting” by airline managers.129 While managers are 
often aware of such gaps or disconnects between legal standards and 
actual company practices, 130  they are ultimately accountable for any 
subsequent accidents.131 
 
Transport Canada has identified numerous cases where operators 
have been caught inadequately monitoring the FDT of their flight crew 
members. 132  The TSB has stated that exceeding permitted FDT limits 
increases the risk of fatigue and, therefore, poses a serious risk to safety.133 
In the Black Sheep Aviation accident, the pilot, who was fatally injured, was 
likely “smudging” his duty and flight time logs by routinely subtracting 
between 0.1 and 0.3 hours from the actual flight time according to the TSB, 
in an attempt to fly more hours and generate more income.134 The reality 
is that many pilots flying for small operators are often paid based on each 
mile flown or per hour, plus an additional meagre monthly stipend.135 In 
other cases, pilots are only paid for each completed flight.136 Therefore, 
                                                 
129 Ibid at 230. 
130 Quinlan, supra note 4 at 28. 
131 Ibid at 106–07. 
132 Transport Canada, “Monitoring of Flight time and Flight Duty Time”, Commercial and 
Business Aviation Advisory Circular No 0207 (13 May 2002), online: Transport Canada 
<www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards/commerce-circulars-ac0207-1677.htm>. 
133 TSB, AIR: Black Sheep, supra note 125 at 29-30: 
Performance and judgment degradation due to fatigue were also considered possible 
contributing factors, as the pilot was functioning in a high-tempo work environment, 
the pilot’s duty days had exceeded 14 hours several times in the previous 10 days, 
and the requirement for 1 extra hour of rest time per day was not being met. The pilot 
had also exceeded the 7-day 60-hour flight time limit imposed by regulations. 
Although it was estimated that the pilot’s sleep/work cycles were sufficiently regular 
to avoid fatigue, he was helping unload or attend to the aircraft during the day—
physically demanding tasks that left him no opportunity for rest breaks during the 
duty days. 
134 Ibid at 30: 
A downward adjustment of times recorded in aircraft journey log and flight duty 
records would have deferred flight interruptions due to scheduled maintenance and 
duty day limitations, increasing the pilot’s opportunity to fly. The more flying the 
pilot did, the greater the pilot’s income was, and the sooner the pilot could return to 
family life. 
135 Anderson v Buffalo Airways Ltd, 2001 NWTSC 3 at para 3 [Anderson]: 
Joe McBryan, president and major shareholder of [Buffalo Airways], gave evidence 
of the defendant's practice of recruiting and employing pilots over the past thirty 
[years] here in northern Canada. Pilots who are recent graduates of flying school are 
initially hired at “entry level” positions, e.g., ramp attendant, freight handler, flight 
attendant, etc. Within six months or so the person would work his/her way into a 
flying job, i.e., as a co-pilot. In 1993-1995, the pay was $1300/month plus 13 cents 
mileage. Most pilots come to work for a northern operator in order to gain 
experience, in order to advance their career, in order to get lots of flying hours 
towards their “captain” qualification. Most are candid in acknowledging that their 
focus is eventually to go back south with one of the major airlines. As one pilot 
witness put it, “everyone was there as a stepping stone...” 
136  Transport Canada, “SATOPS”, Final Report, TP 13158 E (Spring 1998) at 34, online: 
Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/ca-publications/tp13158.pdf> 
[Transport Canada, “SATOPS”]. 
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underpaid pilots are forced to maximise their flying and duty hours to 
achieve a decent salary.137 Transport Canada has stated that these methods 
of remuneration negatively affect the safe decision-making of pilots, 138 
especially for seasonal and contract pilots, and that a fixed salary method 
would likely offset this pressure.139 Pilots and carriers should not make 
their operational decisions based on remuneration, but rather on safety 
imperatives.140 Hence, there may be a correlation between pilot fatigue 
and remuneration structures.141 
 
 Likewise, there has been an unfortunate tendency with pilots flying 
for more than one operator to unintentionally or even deliberately omit 
the reporting of non-company time to their primary employer. 142 
Transport Canada has reminded pilots and operators in the past that all 
time spent working and flying for another operator must be calculated 
towards the primary employer’s FDT.143 In sum, properly logging FDT 
data is crucial to ensure a safe and reliable air transportation network, as 
rested pilots will perform better and will inevitably prevent further 
fatigue-related incidents from occurring. 
 
V. FLIGHT TIME RESTRICTIONS IN THE 
CANADIAN AVIATION REGULATIONS 
 
A. CALCULATING FLIGHT TIME FOR CANADIAN 
OPERATORS 
 
Before analysing the current regulations, we must draw a 
fundamental distinction between “flight time limitations” and “duty time 
limitations”.144 Flight time limitations restrict the number of hours a pilot 
can fly within a given period of time. The CARs define flight time as: 
 
the time from the moment an aircraft first moves under its own 
power for the purpose of taking off until the moment it comes to 
rest at the end of the flight[.]145 
                                                 
137 Ibid. 
138 Quinlan, supra note 4 at 184. There is a demonstrated correlation between the salary 
structure of a company’s employees and the overall safety levels of an organisation. 
139 Transport Canada, “SATOPS”, supra note 136 at 34. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See Quinlan, supra note 4 at 184. 
142 Transport Canada, “SATOPS”, supra note 136 at 34. 
143 See Black Sheep Aviation, supra note 79. It is worth noting that such flight and duty time 
includes flying time flown for other operators and in private aircraft. 
144 See respective definitions in Part VI, below. 
145  Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 101.01(1). In practice, flight time is 
frequently calculated, as per most aircraft industry checklists, once the aircraft’s engines start 
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Flight time restrictions, therefore, strictly refer to the specific time 
when an aircraft is operated by a pilot-in-command having the legal 
responsibility and authority over the operation and safety of such 
aircraft.146 Flight time restrictions exclude any time spent working before 
or after a flight is completed. The applicable flight time limitations set out 
in the CARs are summarised in Table 3 below. 
 
If a pilot conducts flights under more than one type of operation, for 
instance logs both air taxi and commuter flights during a specific period 
of time, either for the same operator or for more than one operator at the 
same time, Transport Canada has stated in its guidance materials that such 
a pilot would be limited to fly the “less restrictive flight time limits once 
the more restrictive limit has been reached”. 147  This scenario could 
materialise, for example, when a pilot starts flying for a new employer 
operating a different aircraft type than his or her previous employer, or if 
the pilot is assigned to fly multiple different aircraft types within the same 
company during the same period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
and until the engines are completely shut down. 
146 Pilot-in-command “means, in relation to an aircraft, the pilot having responsibility and 
authority for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time”. Aeronautics Act, supra 
note 69, s 3(1). Of course, some more complex aircraft require that the pilot-in-command be 
legally accompanied in the cockpit by a co-pilot and, in some cases, by a flight engineer. 
147  Transport Canada, Guidance Material Concerning Flight Time and Flight Duty Time 
Limitations and Rest Periods, R 740.15, online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/media/ 
documents/ca-standards/orientation700.pdf> [Transport Canada, “Guidance Material”]. 
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Table 3: Flight Time Limitations (CARs 700.15) 
 
 
To illustrate this rule and the latter scenario, consider the example 
of a Canadian pilot flying for the same company a multi-engine Beechcraft 
58 Baron with fewer than nine seats (i.e. an air taxi operation) 148 and a 
multi-engine Beechcraft 1900 with a 19-seat passenger configuration (i.e. a 
commuter operation).149 If the pilot reaches the 40-hour limit applicable 
for commuters within 7 consecutive days flying either the Beechcraft 58 
Baron or the Beechcraft 1900, or a combination of both aircraft at the same 
time, the remaining flight time of twenty hours allowed under air taxi 
regulations (60-hour limit within 7 consecutive days) can be completed as 
                                                 
148  See Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 703.01. The Beechcraft Baron is 
configured to sit four to six passengers and can, therefore, operate as a 703 carrier, since it 
carries under 9 passengers and has a MCTOW (“means the weight identified as such in the 
type certificate of an aircraft”) of less than 19,000 pounds. 
149 Ibid, s 704.01. 
 Within 
365 
consecu-
tive 
days 
Within 
90 
consecu-
tive 
days 
Within 30 
consecutive 
days 
Within 7 
consecuti-
ve days 
Within 24 
consecutive hours 
Aerial 
work 
 
702 
Operators 
1,200 
hours 
300 
hours 
120 hours or 
100 hours for 
flight crew 
members on 
call 
60 hours 8 hours for single-
pilot IFR operations 
 
No flight time limits 
for VFR operations 
Air Taxis 
 
703 
Operators 
1,200 
hours 
300 
hours 
120 hours or 
100 hours for 
flight crew 
members on 
call 
60 hours 8 hours for single-
pilot IFR operations 
 
No flight time limits 
for VFR operations 
Commut-
ers 
 
704 
Operators 
1,200 
hours 
300 
hours 
120 hours or 
100 hours for 
flight crew 
members on 
call 
40 hours if 
operating 
an aircraft 
other than 
a 
helicopter 
8 hours for single-
pilot IFR operations 
 
No flight time limits 
for VFR operations 
Airlines 
 
705 
Operators 
1,200 
hours 
300 
hours 
120 hours or 
100 hours for 
flight crew 
members on 
call 
40 hours if 
operating 
an aircraft 
other than 
a 
helicopter 
8 hours for single-
pilot IFR operations 
 
No flight time limits 
for VFR operations 
Helicopt-
er 
Operators  
1,200 
hours 
300 
hours 
120 hours or 
100 hours for 
flight crew 
members on 
call 
60 hours 8 hours for single-
pilot IFR operations 
 
No flight time limits 
for VFR operations 
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long as the remaining hours are flown entirely in the smaller air taxi 
aircraft class – the Beechcraft 58 Baron.150 These regulations enable carriers 
to utilise their pilots with flexible flying hours in different aircraft types at 
the same time. These rules ultimately reach a safe compromise allowing 
carriers to maximise their permitted flying hours in each aircraft type, 
without allowing pilots to circumvent the CARs while flying longer hours 
in more complex and demanding aircraft. 
 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DEROGATIONS BY TRANSPORT 
CANADA 
 
Carriers may also apply for a derogation from Transport Canada to 
increase their flight time limitations in its Air Operator’s Certificate 
(AOC). This less restrictive derogation is known in the industry as an 
Operations Specifications (OPS Specs). For instance, OPS Specs 092 151 
allows any type of carrier, during six non-overlapping periods of 30 
consecutive days within a 365-consecutive day period, to increase the total 
flight time permitted for each pilot to a maximum of: 
 
 1200 hours in any 365 consecutive days; 
 900 hours in any 180 consecutive days; 
 450 hours in any 90 consecutive days; 
 210 hours in any 42 consecutive days; 
 150 hours in any 30 consecutive days; and 
 60 hours in any 7 consecutive days.152 
 
Noticeable exemptions are found in the 30-day and 90-day periods. 
These exemptions permit high-tempo operations, including oil rig 
helicopter ferry pilots, or seasonal operators, such as tour guides or bush 
operators (e.g., float plane pilots), to maximise the use of their pilots 
during a short but profitable period of flying. If the pilot is provided with 
at least 5 days of consecutive rest,153 free from any duties, the flight times 
accumulated for the 30-consecutive day, 42-consecutive day, and 90-
                                                 
150 See Transport Canada, “Guidance Material”, supra note 147. 
151 Transport Canada, “Operations Specification 092: Increase in Flight Time” (10 October 
1996), online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards/commerce-
certification-ops-092-1648.htm> (“This operations specification is issued pursuant to 
paragraph 700.15(2)(a) of the Canadian Aviation Regulations. An increase in Flight Time is 
authorized. This operations specification is valid if the air operator complies with the 
requirements of section 720.15 of the Commercial Air Service Standards”). 
152  OPS Specs 93 also allows an increase in flight duty time if authorised by Transport 
Canada. See Transport Canada, “Operations Specification 093: Increase in Flight Duty Time” 
(10 October 1996), online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards 
/commerce-certification-ops-093-1649.htm>. 
153 In this example, the calculation is made with the assumption that the carrier has not 
obtained an Operation Specification 092 derogation. 
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consecutive day period limitations may be reset to zero.154 
 
Unfortunately, the current flight time regulations do not take into 
account cumulative duty time fatigue,155 as the current limitations found 
in Operations Specification 092 can result in duty hours of up to 60 to 90 
hours a week.156 In Anderson v Buffalo Airways, for instance, the court noted 
that pilots working for Buffalo Airways, a northern airline operating out 
of Yellowknife, were often on duty between 250 and 300 hours per 
month.157 Scientific evidence has concluded that working beyond 48 hours 
a week has a negative impact on work performance.158 To address this 
problem, it has been recommended in the NPA that flight time limits in 
the CARs should be amended to a maximum of “112 flight hours in any 
28 consecutive days”, “300 flight hours in any 90 consecutive days”, and 
“1,000 flight hours in any 365 consecutive days”, 159  which would far 
exceed the current minimum rest periods discussed later in this article. 
Shorter flight time limits would likely reduce the associated duty times 
and mitigate pilot fatigue. The deadly Black Sheep Aviation accident is 
evidence that allowing pilots to work extended number of hours can have 
fatal consequences.160 
 
C. SINGLE-PILOT IFR FLIGHTS 
 
If a pilot conducts single-pilot IFR flights, meaning that an aircraft 
is operated under an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)161 flight plan with a 
                                                 
154 Black Sheep Aviation, supra note 79; Transport Canada, “Appendix D: Air Taxi, Aerial 
Work, and Helicopter Operations”, Commercial and Business Aviation Advisory Circular 
No 0091R (1 April 1996), online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/ 
standards/commerce-circulars-ac0091r_att4-1631.htm>; Transport Canada, “SFO-9b Flight 
and Duty Times - 703”, online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/ 
publications/tp13750-checklists-sfo9b-2574.htm>. 
155 See generally Quinlan, supra note 4 at 70. 
156 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 4. 
157 Anderson, supra note 135. Interestingly, pilots were not paid for each hour worked, but 
rather based on each mile flown by them. Therefore, hours spent working on the ground 
were not entirely remunerated, aside from the base pay. 
158 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 3-4: 
During a study of medical interns, the weekly scheduled hours were reduced from 
an average between 77 to 81 hours to an average of between 60 to 63 hours per week. 
This reduction of weekly work hours had a marked effect on diagnostic errors. 
Interns made 5.6 times as many serious diagnostic errors during the longer work 
week than during the shorter work week – fatigue negatively affected their decision 
making abilities. Another study showed that working at least 12 hours per day was 
associated with a 37% increased hazard rate and working at least 60 hours per week 
was associated with a 23% increased hazard rate. 
159 Ibid at 21. 
160 See TSB, AIR: Black Sheep, supra note 125. 
161 David-Cooper, “Landing”, supra note 14 at 459: 
“IFR” refers to Instrument Flight Rules. When flying in IFR conditions (e.g. when 
flying in reduced visibility, in cloud, or on an IFR flight plan), pilots are required 
under law to be licensed to fly their aircraft using only their flight instruments, have 
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lone pilot not accompanied by any co-pilot, he or she may not fly beyond 
8 hours in any 24 consecutive hours.162 This limitation applies whether or 
not the pilot has flown only a single second with an IFR flight plan or a 
total of eight hours.163 For example, if a pilot takes off from an airport in 
IFR conditions, cancels his or her IFR flight plan minutes after departure, 
and continues his or her route under a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight 
plan,164 the pilot will still be limited to 8 hours of flight time in the next 24 
hours, regardless of the fact that he or she only flew only very few minutes 
in IFR conditions.165 The mere fact that a flight is flown under an IFR flight 
plan will automatically trigger an 8-hour flight time restrictions for the 
next 24 hours. Otherwise, carriers would continuously fly below the 8-
hour mark to avoid triggering this limitation. 
 
 It must be noted that, at times, IFR flying can be a strenuous and 
stressful exercise for pilots flying in challenging weather conditions. In 
IFR conditions, pilots must often fly and land their aircraft solely by 
following and monitoring complex avionics systems, without looking 
outside the cockpit window to visually orient themselves, in some cases 
until the aircraft is only seconds away from landing on the runway. Hence, 
these regulations aim to prevent single pilots from becoming overly 
fatigued when flying extended hours alone in challenging weather 
conditions whilst juggling with multiple flying tasks. Alternatively, 
carriers may implement company procedures requiring two pilots for IFR 
operations to avoid triggering the 8-hour flight time limit. As such, 
carriers wishing to maximise the use of their assets may do so by adding 
a co-pilot. 
 
While hiring two pilots to fly IFR operations for a single flight might 
not be necessarily profitable, it may be a financially attractive option to 
utilise two pilots over an extended period of time. An additional co-pilot 
also decreases the risk of accidents, since he or she can identify mistakes 
                                                 
operational IFR avionics and adhere to certain weather minima. 
All IFR flights must be, under law, flown with an IFR flight plan. 
162 See Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.15(1). 
163 See Ibid, s 602.73(1); NavCanada, “The Life of a Flight Plan” in Transport Canada, Aviation 
Safety Letter, TP 185E, Issue 2/2009 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
2009), online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/ca-publications/tp185e 
_2_2009.pdf>. 
164 See Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 101.01(1). VFR are “a set of regulations 
under which a pilot operates an aircraft in weather conditions generally clear enough to 
allow the pilot to see where the aircraft is going. Using the VFR Flight rules, the pilot must 
be able to operate the aircraft with visual reference to the ground, and by visually avoiding 
obstructions and other aircraft”. International Virtual Aviation Organisation, “Visual Flight 
Rules”, version 2.3 (18 October 2015), online: International Virtual Aviation Organisation 
<www.ivao.aero/training/documentation/books/PP_ADC_Visual_Flight_Rules.pdf>. 
165 See Transport Canada, “Guidance Material”, supra note 147. 
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or intervene, if necessary. An additional pilot also allows the captain to 
delegate ancillary tasks to the co-pilot, such as monitoring flight 
instruments, navigating the aircraft, and communicating with air traffic 
control (ATC), while the captain focuses on flying the aircraft. In single-
pilot IFR flights, the pilot-in-command must handle all these 
responsibilities at once, which can become an impossible task in the 
unlikely event of a serious emergency.166 
 
VI. DUTY TIME LIMITS IN CANADA 
 
A. THE DEFINITION OF “DUTY TIME” 
 
Similar to flight time restrictions, duty time limits vary depending 
on the type of flight operation conducted by each individual pilot. Distinct 
in nature from flight time, the current duty time definition contained in 
the CARs has a wider scope of application than flight time, as it applies to 
any time spent by a pilot once he or she reports for working duty167 at his 
or her place of employment (e.g., the airport), on top of any flight time 
logged by a pilot, until the end of the final flight of the day or until the 
pilot is released by his or her employer.168 This time includes preparation 
time before a flight is conducted and any operational delays encountered 
during this period. 169  According to ICAO, any tasks conducted at the 
behest of the carrier should be counted towards duty time.170 According to 
the NPA, duty means “any task that a flight crew member is assigned by 
an air operator at a specific time, including flight duty, administrative 
work, training, positioning, and standby”.171 Irrespective of the type of 
operation, if a pilot reports for a flight assignment and the flight is 
subsequently cancelled, the time spent between reporting for duty and 
cancelling the flight should count towards the total duty time 
                                                 
166  TSB, AOR: Engine, supra note 30 at 16 (‘’Pilot fatigue can, after an emergency or 
abnormality is detected, lead to errors in judgement’’). 
167 ICAO defines reporting time as the “time at which flight and cabin crew members are 
required by an operator to report for duty”. Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.2.3. 
168 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 101.01(1). 
169  Ibid. In cases of operational delays (e.g., temporary mechanical issues or weathers 
conditions), it is, therefore, not rare for passengers to have their flights either postponed or 
cancelled because flight crews have exceeded their permitted duty time, even though the 
aircraft is fit to fly and weather conditions become perfectly safe eventually. 
170 Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.7.2.1, provides: 
These include, but are not limited to: pre-flight preparation; conduct of the flight 
(whether or not this is commercial air transport); post flight actions; training given 
or received (classroom, flight simulator or aeroplane); rostered office/management 
time; and positioning. Standby should be included to the extent that it is likely to 
induce fatigue. 
171 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 10. Although it is not a legal requirement yet, 
the NPA suggests that, for duty times exceeding 6 hours, all types of operators should 
provide their pilots with the opportunity to eat and drink. 
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calculation.172 If the reporting time to the airport is delayed for more than 
3 hours, for example, because of bad weather or aircraft maintenance 
difficulties, and the pilot is notified before leaving a rest facility, his or her 
duty time is also considered to start 3 hours after the scheduled reporting 
time.173 
 
For pilots conducting aerial work or air taxi operations, flight duty 
time is defined in the CARs as: 
 
the period that starts when a flight crew member reports for a flight, 
or reports as a flight crew member on standby, and finishes at 
engines off or rotors stopped at the end of the final flight…174 
 
In the case of pilots flying for an airline or a commuter operator, the same 
duty time calculation applies, but must include an additional 15 minutes 
after the engines, or rotors in the case of helicopters, are shutdown to take 
into account post-flight duties.175 Except for helicopter operations, duty 
time for airline and commuter pilots also includes the time required to 
complete any duties assigned by the air operator prior to the reporting 
time and the time required to complete aircraft maintenance engineer 
duties prior to or following a flight.176 
 
Therefore, duty time calculations for airlines and commuters must 
also include any time spent after a flight conducting ancillary flight tasks, 
such as completing administrative paperwork requirements (e.g., filling 
out aircraft journey logs), flight planning, parking and securing their 
aircraft, shutting down avionics systems, refuelling, escorting their 
passengers to a terminal, covering the aircraft surfaces and engines during 
the winter, etc. 
 
 This duty time distinction between the 702-703 and 704-705 
operators is rather peculiar, since 702 and 703 pilots often work in 
challenging working environments and in remote areas with little or no 
                                                 
172 See Letter from Rebecca B MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for International Law, 
Legislation and Regulations, US FAA, to Neal Boyle, Island Airways (12 October 2012) in US, 
Federal Aviation Administration, “Regulations Division: Legal Interpretations & Chief 
Counsel’s Opinions”, online: FAA <www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ 
agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/interpretations/data/interps/2012/boyle-islandairways%2 
0-%20(2012)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf>. As such, any time spent on duty, even if no 
flight is completed or even scheduled to be completed on a specific day, must be counted 
towards the total duty time. 
173 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.18. 
174 Ibid, s 101.01(1) [emphasis added]. 
175 Ibid, s 700.16(1). 
176 Ibid, s 101.01(1). 
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outside assistance and airport infrastructure. At first glance, it is 
interesting to note that 702 and 703 pilots may not count the completion 
of strenuous post-flight and pre-flight tasks towards their total duty time. 
On the other hand, 704 and 705 pilots, who often rely on more 
sophisticated company infrastructure, can generally rely on ground 
personnel, such as cargo handlers, ramp attendants, boarding agents, and 
flight attendants, to efficiently assist them in the completion of most 
ancillary flight tasks. 177  Although this difference likely exists to afford 
smaller carriers operational flexibility, this approach puts some pilots at 
the mercy of demanding work schedules, where gruelling tasks, such as 
loading and unloading passengers and cargo, are often not counted 
towards their total duty time.178 ICAO has addressed this issue in Annex 
6, according to which, time required to conduct pre-flight safety and 
service duties, otherwise referred to as pre-flight report time, as well as 
time spent conducting post-flight duties, should count as duty time.179 As 
such, this distinction for 702 and 703 operators is contrary to Annex 6 
SARPs. 
 
B. MAXIMUM DUTY TIME 
 
Under current duty time restrictions, flight crew members cannot 
be assigned to more than 14 consecutive hours of work within 24 
consecutive hours when working for any operator.180 Pilots are, therefore, 
allowed to obtain a minimum rest period of 10 hours within each period 
of 24 hours during which a pilot has worked. The NPA recommends that 
pilots should not be on duty for more than 12 hours to effectively manage 
flight crew fatigue.181 Considering that pilots are responsible for the lives 
of their passengers, it is difficult to imagine how effective a pilot’s reflexes 
would be by the end of his or her 14-hour duty in challenging flying 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
177 In fact, airline pilots, who fly their aircraft in elegant business attires, will rarely exercise 
any physical tasks, aside from their pre-flight ground inspection of the aircraft. 
178 Moreover, we can assume that, since these ancillary tasks are not counted towards their 
total duty time, this time is likely not remunerated either. 
179 Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.7.3.2. 
180 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.16(1). 
181 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 3, supports this assertion: 
Research has shown that fatigue increases as shifts increase in length, with associated 
increases in accident likelihood. Studies have found a transient increase in risk after 
2-4 hours with much larger increases observed after 9-10 hours and 12 hours on shift. 
A near two-fold increase in likelihood of incident or accident has been found 
following 10 hours compared to 8 hours on shift. A three-fold increase in accident 
likelihood has been found to occur after 16 hours. A study from the United States 
found that working at least 12 hours per day was associated with a 37% increased 
hazard rate. The science does not support a 14 hour flight duty period. 
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When looking at rest periods, a pilot must also be able to 
demonstrate that he or she has obtained 10 hours of consecutive rest 
within the past 24 consecutive hours preceding the planned completion 
time of a flight assignment.182 If a pilot working for a commuter or an 
airline183 is assigned to three consecutive flight assignments exceeding 12 
consecutive hours each, he or she must take a 24-hour minimum rest 
period before working again, unless a 24-hour break has been completed 
between each flight duty assignment.184 The NPA further suggests that 
this rest period should allow the pilot to sleep at least 5 consecutive hours 
between 20:00 and 6:00 local time. 185  To ensure that pilots are 
appropriately rested, company management should conduct reasonable 
planning of a pilot’s flight assignments based on actual trip conditions, 
such as the aircraft performance capabilities, operational circumstances, 
including weather and wind, expected air traffic and airport delays, etc.186 
For example, management should expect longer delays during holidays at 
major hub airports, in comparison with flights flown into less congested 
regional airports on a normal weekday with perfect weather conditions. 
As a shared responsibility, management has a key role when scheduling 
air crew rosters to ensure compliance with duty time regulations. 
 
While the CARs permit a pilot to be on duty for up to 14 hours a 
day, the CARs do not set a limit for the pilot’s “time since awakening”, 
meaning that a pilot who wakes up several hours before his or her 
upcoming shift, or an on-call pilot who has been awake for a full day 
before receiving a call to come in for work, is not accounted for. If a pilot 
is on duty for 14 hours straight, we can easily imagine a scenario where 
the same pilot has been awake for close to 20 hours, if not more. Thus, 
there is a need to revisit the maximum permissible duty time. A fair 
solution would be to emulate the work limits found in the Labour Code 
                                                 
182 Alexander H Beringer et al, “Part 135 Rest & Duty - Gauging Your Compliance”, National 
Business Aviation Association (10 February 2016) at 22. For example, if an air taxi pilot 
reports for duty at 7:00 local time and is scheduled to complete his or her last flight at 20:00 
local time on the same day, the pilot must “lookback” 24 hours and determine if he or she 
has obtained the 10 hours of consecutive rest in the last day. In this example, the pilot would 
be required to rest for at least 10 hours between 20:00 local time on the previous day and 7:00 
local time on the following day. As such, the pilot who reports to work at 7:00 local time 
would not be allowed to work beyond 21:00 local time the same day. 
183 This rule excludes helicopter flight operations.  
184 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.16(2). However, these rules do not apply 
to 702 and 703 carriers. 
185 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 16-17. 
186 See Beringer et al, supra note 182 at 23. Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.4.3, 
provides: 
Flights should be planned to be completed within the allowable flight duty period 
taking into account the time necessary for pre-flight duties, the flight and turn-
around times, and the nature of the operation. Minimum rest periods needed to 
provide adequate rest should be based upon the actual operation. 
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and bring maximum duty time closer to 8 hours a day.187 
 
C. DEADHEADING 
 
Another interesting feature with the CARs is how duty time is only 
triggered once a pilot reports to his or her place of employment or reports 
for standby duties as a reserve pilot, and finishes when the aircraft engines 
are shutdown (or 15 minutes later in the case of commuters and airlines).188 
However, Annex 6 provides that the time spent by a pilot travelling from 
his or her home to the point of reporting for duty (i.e. commuting) does 
not count towards duty time,189 even though ICAO asserts that this can 
have an adverse effect on pilot fatigue.190 The CARs also infer that duty 
time does not include the time spent travelling as a flying passenger to 
and from another base of operations (i.e. an airport) to conduct flight 
operations,191 otherwise referred to in the industry as “repositioning”192 or 
“deadheading”. 193  However, this author suggests that, because it 
contributes to more pilot fatigue, deadheading is not a rest period and, a 
contrario, it should be considered as duty time as a best practice.194 At the 
time of this writing, the CARs have not expressly identified whether or 
not deadheading time should be calculated in the total duty time. 
 
This highlights a regulatory void where pilots may be required to 
commute considerable hours, without that time being included in their 
                                                 
187 Labour Code, supra note 98. 
188 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 101.01(1). 
189 Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 2.3.2, provides: 
A flight duty period does not include the period of travelling time from home to the 
point of reporting for duty. It is the responsibility of the flight or cabin crew member 
to report for duty in an adequately rested condition. 
190 Ibid, Attachment A, para 4.8.1.4, provides: 
Travelling time spent by a flight or cabin crew member in transit between the place 
of rest and the place of reporting for duty is not counted as duty, even though it is a 
factor contributing to fatigue. Excessive travelling time undertaken immediately 
before commencing a flight duty period could therefore detract from a flight or cabin 
crew member’s ability to counter fatigue arising whilst on duty, and should therefore 
be taken into account when deciding where pre-flight rest should be taken. 
191 Indeed, no laws or interpretative guidance regarding FDT regulations specify whether or 
not time spent deadheading must be calculated when monitoring FDT compliance. 
192 ICAO defines “positioning” and “deadheading”, which are synonymous terms, as the 
“transferring of a non-operating crew member from place to place as a passenger at the 
behest of the operator”. Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 4.2.5. 
193 See James L Simmons & Jeffrey S Forrest, “United States Aviation Safety Data: Uses and 
Issues Related to Sanctions and Confidentiality” (2005) 70:1 J Air L & Com 83 at 94; Blanca I 
Rodriguez, “Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law” (2000-2001) 66:1 J Air L & Com 
21 at 86, 224-25; Eloise Cotugno, “No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintiffs from Either 
Courts or Legislature: Montreal Protocol 3 Drowns in Committee” (1992-1993) 58:3 J Air L & 
Com 745 at 764; Gleimer, supra note 19 at 996. 
194 Beringer et al, supra note 182 at 13. 
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duty time or even remunerated.195 It appears from a literal interpretation 
of current duty time regulations that a pilot, who flies in the jump seat of 
another flight to report to another sub-base of operations196 where he or 
she is scheduled to fly, will only start calculating his or her duty time once 
he or she reports at the latter base of operations. 197  Of course, many 
companies will manage this potentially unsafe interpretation of the CARs 
with adequate policies to manage pilot fatigue (e.g., voluntary FRMS) and 
thus fill this regulatory gap. However, smaller cash-strapped operators 
may be tempted to utilise their pilots up to the very limits permitted under 
the law, even if doing so may not be entirely safe.198 In this regard, Annex 
6 provides that pilots are responsible for refusing further flights if they 
suffer from fatigue, which may adversely affect flight safety.199 
 
For instance, a pilot who completes his or her last flight of the day 
will stop calculating the duty time after the aircraft engines are shutdown 
(or 15 minutes after in the case of commuters and airlines), but may not 
include the time spent repositioning after completing his or her duties 
either to his or her home base or another base of operations. If a pilot 
completes, for example, his or her last flight at 19:00 local time and is put 
on a 3-hour long repositioning flight an hour later at 20:00 local time to 
another base of operations where he or she is scheduled to fly at 7:00 local 
time, it is difficult to imagine how that person will achieve sufficient rest 
prior to the next flight and report fit for flying duties early the next 
morning. Unfortunately, the current duty time rules do not take into 
account the reality of many pilots who are often required to travel 
considerable hours by airplane or even by road to reach their next place of 
work. 
 
 Annex 6 expressly states that time spent deadheading should be 
counted towards duty time200 meaning that the CARs are not in sync with 
                                                 
195 See DuBose, supra note 15 at 256-57. 
196 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.01: 
sub-base means a location at which an air operator positions aircraft and personnel 
and from which operational control is exercised in accordance with the air operator’s 
operational control system[.] 
197 For example, a pilot living in Ottawa may be called on short notice by his or her employer 
to replace a sick pilot working for the same company in Vancouver on an important and 
lucrative flying contract. If the pilot is put on a red eye flight the preceding evening to replace 
the other pilot on a flight scheduled to take off on the following morning, no regulation 
would prevent that pilot from working another 14 hours of duty after completing a 6 to 8 
hour positioning assignment. 
198 See generally Quinlan, supra note 4 at 117-21. 
199 Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 2.3.4. 
200 Ibid, Attachment A, para 4.10.3, provides: 
All time spent positioning counts as duty, and positioning followed by operating 
without an intervening rest period also counts as flight duty. However, positioning 
should not count as an operating sector when planning or calculating a flight duty 
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the SARPs contained in Annex 6. To address this regulatory deficiency, 
the NPA has recommended that, when repositioning a flight crew 
member, the operator should count the time spent repositioning as duty 
time. 201  It is the author’s opinion that, even though the NPA is not a 
binding document, it demonstrates legislative intent regarding upcoming 
changes to the CARs and its stance on calculating deadheading time 
should, therefore, be followed as a best practice by Canadian carriers. If 
the time spent deadheading exceeds the permitted duty time, the NPA 
recommends that the subsequent rest period should be as long as the 
preceding duty period if the extension is three hours or less, and twice as 
long as the previous duty time period when the exceedance is more than 
three hours.202 
 
While they do not expressly consider deadheading as duty time, the 
CARs provide that, if a pilot is required by his or her employer to 
reposition to another location after reaching the FDT limits, the pilot must 
enjoy an additional rest period “at least equal to one-half the time spent 
travelling that is in excess of the flight crew member’s maximum flight 
duty time”.203 Therefore, if a pilot reaches the maximum permitted duty 
time of 14 hours and is required to reposition twice on a 2-hour flight each 
way, for a total of 4 hours deadheading before and after his or her daily 
flight assignment is completed, the pilot in question will have worked 18 
hours in one single day and will only receive an additional 2 hours of rest, 
even though the pilot has worked 4 additional hours. As a result, pilots, 
who must deadhead from one base of operations to another on a regular 
or even a daily basis over a period of several months, will continuously 
accrue more and more cumulative fatigue, as deadheading time is only 
compensated at a 50% ratio. Therefore, future amendments to the CARs 
should include deadheading time into the calculation of duty time, as this 
would address serious pilot fatigue concerns. 
 
D. MINIMUM REST PERIODS 
 
Carriers must provide their flight crew with sufficient rest. The 
CARs define the minimum rest period as an 8-hour period “during which 
a flight crew member is free from all duties, is not interrupted by the air 
operator or private operator”.204 This rest period must include sufficient 
                                                 
period. 
In the wording of the SARPs, the term “should” indicates a non-binding recommended 
practice and is, therefore, not compulsory for ICAO Member States. 
201 See Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 21. 
202 See ibid. 
203 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.20. 
204 Ibid, s 101.01(1). 
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time to “sleep in suitable accommodation, time to travel to and from that 
accommodation and time for personal hygiene and meals”.205 Once a pilot 
completes a flight assignment, a pilot is entitled to obtain a minimum rest 
period (otherwise referred to as “time free from duty”) and, if there is a 
need, any additional time required to be fully rested before reporting to 
subsequent flight duties. 206  This period cannot include any activities 
related to the company, such as training, company meetings, ground 
duties, or being on-call.207 A contrario, any time that is not considered as 
rest should be considered as company duty time.208 By defining duty time, 
we should automatically define rest time, since the latter automatically 
begins when the duty time ends.209 
 
However, the current regulations do not take into account the fact 
that it takes for an ordinary person 9 hours in bed to achieve 8 hours of 
sleep and it requires at least 12 hours off duty to obtain the desired 8 hours 
of sleep.210 This insufficient rest period may de facto contravene the Annex 
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid, s 700.16(3). 
207 See also similar rules in the US: Letter from Donald P Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, 
Regulations and Enforcement Division, US FAA, to B Stephen Fortenberry, B-727 Chief Pilot, 
Evergreen International Airlines, Inc. (19 June 1991) in US, Federal Aviation Administration, 
“Regulations Division: Legal Interpretations & Chief Counsel’s Opinions”, online: FAA <ww 
w.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/interpre
tations/data/interps/1991/fortenberry%20-%20(1991)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf> 
(Although not binding for Canadian-registered carriers, the US FAA’s highly authoritative 
legal memorandums define “rest” as follows: “A rest period must be prospective in nature. 
Stated another way, a flight crewmember must be told in advance that he or she will be on a 
rest period for the duration required [by the regulations]. In addition, a rest period must be 
free of all restraint. However, the Agency’s interpretations hold that receipt of one telephone 
call or beeper call does not constitute a violation of a rest period provision. Moreover, a flight 
crewmember in a rest period must be free of present responsibility for work should the 
occasion arise”). See also Letter from Rebecca B MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel, 
Regulations Division, US FAA, to Condace K Kolander, Coordinator, Air Safety, Health and 
Security Association of Flight Attendants (29 April 2005) in US, Federal Aviation 
Administration, “Regulations Division: Legal Interpretations & Chief Counsel’s Opinions”, 
online: FAA <www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/pol_adjudication 
/agc200/interpretations/data/interps/2005/kolander%20-%20(2005)%20legal%20interpret 
ation.pdf> (“The agency has previously said that the nature of rest is the same, regardless of 
the operation or the subpart under which a flight assignment is performed. Rest must satisfy 
three conditions in order to qualify as a rest period: It must be 1) a continuous period of time, 
2) determined prospectively, and 3) during which the crewmember is free from all restraint 
by the certificate holder, including freedom from present responsibility from work should 
the occasion arise”). 
208 Beringer et al, supra note 182 at 35. 
209 See DuBose, supra note 15 at 267. 
210 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 4. DuBose, supra note 15 at 267 [footnotes 
omitted], notes:  
[U]nder existing regulations, the rest-time clock begins when the pilot’s duty period 
ends. This means that commuting time—local or by air—is counted against the 
pilot’s rest period. The eight hour rest period under current regulations includes time 
spent in customs, travel from the airport, hotel check-in, shower, sleep, meals, and 
hopefully, rest. “At the very most, if you’re the kind of person that could walk into a 
hotel room, strip and lay down, you might get four and a half hours of sleep[.]” 
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6 recommendation of providing “crew members with adequate rest 
opportunity to recover from fatigue before commencement of the next 
flight duty period”.211 Therefore, minimum rest regulations should also be 
revisited. It has been recommended in the NPA that the 8-hour rest period 
be extended to 10 hours when staying at a rest facility away from the 
pilot’s ordinary home and 12 hours of rest when at home base212 to take 
into account the time required for commuting and the “necessities of 
life”.213 This approach would bring the CARs in line with Annex 6. 
 
Operators are as well required to provide flight crew members with 
time free from any duties during specific time windows. For airlines and 
commuter operators not operating helicopters, pilots must have at least 36 
consecutive hours of rest within each 7 consecutive days,214 or at least 3 
full days of rest within 17 consecutive days.215 These air carriers, therefore, 
have the opportunity to decide on two different scheduling schemes 
under the CARs.216 On the other hand, aerial work operators, air taxis, and 
helicopter operators must afford their pilots with 24 hours of rest 13 times 
within each period of 90 consecutive days and 3 times within each period 
of 30 consecutive days.217 Pilots who are on-call must enjoy a minimum 
rest period of 36 consecutive hours every 7 consecutive days (i.e. a 
maximum of 5.5 days of work per week)218 and at least 3 consecutive days 
                                                 
211 Annex 6, supra note 13, Attachment A, para 1.3. 
212 Transport Canada, Flight, supra note 47 at 11: 
Home base means the location nominated by the operator to the crew member from 
where the crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or a series of duty 
periods and where, under normal circumstances, the operator is not responsible for 
the accommodation of the crew member concerned. 
213 Ibid at 4; Taylor, supra note 20 at 410. 
214 Transport Canada, “Guidance Material”, supra note 147, R 740.19(1): 
The term consecutive days indicates that the requirement of the regulation must be 
satisfied throughout any of the period of consecutive days indicated. A moving or 
rolling window can be used to verify if the regulatory requirements are satisfied. For 
example, when verifying whether a flight crew member received a period of at least 
3 consecutive calendar days free from duty within each 17 consecutive days, a 17 day 
window can be used. This sliding window can now be placed along the pilot’s 
schedule one day at a time; however, this technique cannot be used when the 
beginning of the window moves inside a period of time free from duty. If the time 
free from duty is always satisfied within the 17 day window, the schedule meets the 
requirement of the regulations. 
215 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.19(1)(a). 
216 Transport Canada, “Guidance Material”, supra note 147, R 740.19(1)(a): 
The intent was to provide the flexibility of two scheduling schemes, but it was 
expected that each scheme would be used independently from the other in a more or 
less continuous state. The regulation is not meant to authorize a mix of the two 
schemes in an arrangement that will produce a working schedule conducive to 
fatigue. The only acceptable way to change from one scheme to the other is to provide 
the pilot 3 consecutive calendar days off. 
217 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.19(1)(b). 
218 See Transport Canada, “Guidance Material”, supra note 147. 
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of rest within a period of 17 consecutive days.219 On-call pilots must also 
enjoy a sufficient rest period within each 24-hour period. 220  However, 
operators may obtain derogations from these minimum rest periods if 
these are permitted under the carrier’s operating certificate.221 The reality 
of the aviation industry is that management and flight crews must 
cooperate closely when balancing flight schedules and minimum rest time 
regulations. 222  Pilots and management must learn to decline flight 
requests by customers, regardless of the value of the contract, if such flight 
might fatigue the flight crew. At the same time, the sales department of a 
carrier must coordinate closely with its crews to ensure that the company 
can meet its contractual obligations efficiently and economically, whilst 
remaining within the safety boundaries of the CARs.223 
 
VII. ARE CANADIAN SKIES UNSAFE? 
 
A. SMALL OPERATORS VERSUS AIRLINES 
 
While pilot fatigue is a growing scourge in the aviation industry, it 
is likely more pronounced in some sectors of the industry. In 2016, 704, 
703, and 702 operators contributed to 2, 26, and 16 accidents, respectively, 
whereas airlines suffered only one accident. 224  Conversely, the only 
fatalities attributable to commercial air operators involved 703 operators 
(1 fatality) and 702 operators (2 fatalities).225 Although 702, 703, and 704 
operators account for only 5% of the air transport market, 226  these 
operators have been responsible together for “94% of all commercial air 
accidents and 95% of commercial air fatalities” in the period between 1 
January 2002 and 5 July 2012.227 While fatigue might not be the only factor 
influencing these statistics, more permissive regulations likely exacerbate 
this sector-specific phenomenon. To further explain these disturbing 
statistics, the TSB has noted: 
                                                 
219 Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 76, s 700.19(1)(c). 
220 Ibid, s 700.21(1). 
221 Ibid, s 700.19(2). 
222 Beringer et al, supra note 182 at 42. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Transportation Safety Board of Canada, “Statistical Summary – Aviation Occurrences 
2016”, online: Transportation Safety Board <www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/stats/aviation/2016/ 
ssea-ssao-2016.asp>. 
225 Ibid. 
226 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, 
Evidence, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Hansard TRAN No 040 (21 March 2007); Statistics Canada, 
“Table 401-0044: Air passenger traffic and flights: annual (number)”, online: Statistics 
Canada <www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a05?lang=eng&id=4010044&pattern=4010044&searc 
hTypeByValue=1&p2=35>. 703 and 704 carriers carry approximately 3.9 million passengers 
annually. 
227 TSB, AIR: Black Sheep, supra note 125. 
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Small operators typically face some interesting challenges. They are 
flying into remote areas that may have little or no infrastructure. 
They often use aircraft that are a little older, that may not have 
sophisticated navigational or warning systems. The crews will 
likely be on the lower end of the experience scale.228 
 
While most airline pilots flying for 705 carriers benefit from the 
protective nature of collective bargaining agreements, strong managerial 
structures, and effective company fatigue risk management processes, the 
remaining categories of commercial operators must self-regulate their 
compliance with the FDT limits under informal processes, often utilising 
their flight crews up to the maximum number of hours permitted by the 
CARs. As illustrated earlier by Table 3, the CARs also permit 702 and 703 
pilots to fly 20 hours above the 40-hour limit prescribed for 704 and 705 
operations. Unfortunately, many 702, 703, and 704 flight crews operate in 
non-unionised working environments with imperfect safety cultures and 
operating practices, which leave many pilots flying for smaller carriers at 
the mercy of their employers’ financial constraints and business priorities 
when exposed to demanding flight assignments in challenging and 
unorthodox work environments.229 
 
Although there is no evidence establishing with certainty a 
correlation between the above-mentioned safety records and Canada’s 
permissive approach to pilot fatigue, there appears to be a genuine need 
to revisit FDT regulations in smaller organisations, which may not 
adequately or proactively mitigate pilot fatigue. In the author’s opinion, 
smaller operators should be subject to more stringent FDT regulations, 
ideally matching the standards prescribed for 704 and 705 operators. 
 
 
                                                 
228  Transportation Safety Board of Canada, “Air safety management systems”, online: 
Transportation Safety Board <www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/videos/surveillance-
watchlist/aviation/aviation-video-04.asp>. 
229 However, even large airlines are not immune from pilot fatigue. See “Air Canada pilot 
fatigue to blame for dipping incident that left 16 injured”, National Post (17 April 2012), 
online: National Post <nationalpost.com/news/canada/air-canada-pilot-fatigue-to-blame-
for-dipping-incident-that-left-16-injured>; Wendy Gillis, “Sleepy Air Canada pilot mistook 
planet for plane, report finds”, The Star (16 April 2012), online: The Star 
<www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/04/16/sleepy_air_canada_pilot_mistook_planet_f
or_plane_report_finds.html>; “Tired pilot caused Air Canada mid-flight dive”, CBC News 
(16 April 2012), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/tired-pilot-caused-air-
canada-mid-flight-dive-1.1139316> (In 2011, a fatigued Air Canada co-pilot on a transatlantic 
night flight from Toronto to Zurich mistook the planet of Venus for a nearby US Air Force 
Boeing C-17 and initiated a rapid descent, which injured 14 passengers and 2 flight 
attendants. In reaction to this incident, the chairman of the Air Canada Pilots Association, 
Barry Wiszniowski, publicly stated that Canada currently has the “worst rules in the planet” 
regarding pilot fatigue). 
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B. THE “STATE FACTOR” 
 
In light of the foregoing, there is likely a relationship between air 
safety and a State’s regulatory framework and oversight for FDT. This 
factor can be coined as the “State Factor”, which can be regarded as a 
fourth contributing factor in James Reason’s accident causation model, in 
addition to other human, technical, and organisational factors. 230  The 
“State Factor” can be defined as the positive or adverse influence of a 
State’s interventions aimed at establishing, improving, and maintaining 
the effectiveness and quality of safety risk controls in civil aviation, 
namely by means of active oversight strategies implementing corrective 
and proactive safety measures, direct enforcement actions, and adequate 
regulatory standards and policies. In other words, effectively managing 
the State Factor can provide the aviation industry with additional defences 
against the existing and emerging safety risks to ensure the effectiveness 
of present laws. 
 
Although little research has addressed the impact of State Factors 
on accidents, one must wonder if we can establish a correlation between 
inadequate FDT regulations and the overall safety of civil aviation in 
Canada. While accident reports frequently identify pilot fatigue as a 
possible contributing factor, Canada does not publish comparative data 
highlighting the overall percentage of accidents directly caused by fatigue 
in relation to other contributing factors for any given year. Moreover, it is 
a challenging task for investigators to measure the correlation between 
fatigue and flight safety, especially when the flight crew has deceased or 
when surviving crew members are silent on this issue to avoid exposing 
themselves and their employer to liability, or simply because fatigue 
remains a taboo subject for many pilots in the industry. 
 
In relation to current FDT regulations, it is difficult to claim with 
certainty that pilot fatigue represents a more significant threat in Canada 
in comparison with other Annex 6-compliant countries. Nonetheless, the 
author argues that a State’s imperfect approach to pilot fatigue, i.e. the 
State Factor, will inevitably lead to an imperfect safety record. 
 
For instance, the US National Transportation Safety Board has 
found that there is a relationship between safety and the amount of time a 
                                                 
230 See James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Brookfield, Vt: Ashgate, 
1997) at 22; “Chapter 5: Safety Management Systems” in Transport Canada Railway Safety 
Act Review Advisory Panel, Stronger Ties: A Shared Commitment to Railway Safety: Review of 
the Railway Safety, November 2007 (Ottawa: Railway Safety Act Review Secretariat, 2007) 63, 
online: Transport Canada <www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/railsafety/TRANSPORT_ 
Stronger_Ties_Report_FINAL_e.pdf>. 
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pilot has been awake, otherwise referred to as “time since awakening”. It 
was observed that fatigued pilots were 40% more likely to make errors 
than non-fatigued pilots, primarily because of the probability of 
committing more omissions, procedural mistakes, and unwise tactical 
decisions.231 Therefore, we can conclude that a country, such as Canada, 
who tolerates longer duty times, and thus longer times since awakening, 
endorses a more permissive regulatory regime where pilots are more 
likely to make errors and endanger flight safety.232 In Australia, the Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority noted: 
 
Sleep deprivation impairs the brain’s effectiveness, with research 
showing it can produce effects very similar to alcohol consumption. 
On-the-job performance loss for every hour of wakefulness between 
10 and 26 hours is equivalent to about a .004 percent rise in blood 
alcohol concentration. Seventeen to 18 hours of wakefulness is 
usually considered to be equivalent to a blood alcohol concentration 
of about .05 per cent. In the safety-critical aviation environment, this 
could result in tragedy.233 
 
                                                 
231 See IATA, ICAO & IFALPA, Fatigue Management Guide for Airline Operators, 2nd ed (2015), 
online: IATA <www.iata.org/publications/Documents/Fatigue-Management-Guide_Airli 
ne%20Operators.pdf>. The Guide, ibid at 13 [footnote omitted], provided: 
The US National Transportation Safety Board has examined the relationship between 
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officer were above the median). For low TSA crews, the median time awake was 5.3 
hours for captains and 5.2 hours for first officers. For high TSA crews the median 
time awake was 13.8 hours for captains and 13.4 hours for first officers. Overall, high 
TSA crews made about 40% more errors than low TSA crews (12.2 versus 8.7 errors), 
primarily due to making more errors of omission (5.5 versus 2.0 errors). In terms of 
error types, high TSA crews made significantly more procedural errors and tactical 
decision errors than low TSA crews. 
232 The US FAA has further concluded that: 
For 10-12 hours of duty time, the proportion of accident pilots with this length of 
duty period is 1.7 times as large as for all pilots. For pilots with 13 or more hours of 
duty, the proportion of accident pilot duty periods is over five and a half times as 
high ... 
 
… 20% of human factor accidents occurred to pilots who had been on duty for 10 or 
more hours, but only 10% of pilot duty hours occurred during that time. Similarly, 
5% of human factor accidents occurred to pilots who had been on duty for 13 or more 
hours, where only 1% of pilot duty hours occur during that time. There is a 
discernible pattern of increased probability of an accident the greater the hours of 
duty time for pilots. 
Jeffrey H Goode, “Are Pilots At Risk of Accidents Due to Fatigue?” (2003) 34:3 J Safety 
Research 309 at 311. 
233 Austl, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, “Fatigue - The Rules Are Changing” (2013) at 10, 
online: Civil Aviation Safety Authority <www.casa.gov.au/file/151091/download?token 
=Y67cN4ib>. 
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Currently, the maximum duty time in the CARs does not address 
“time since awakening”. As a result, it may not be uncommon for a pilot 
nearing his or her maximum duty time limit of 14 hours to be awake for 
up to 20 hours by the time he or she attempts his or her final landing of 
the day. That same pilot would have a level of impairment equivalent to 
a person with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08%, which is the legal 
threshold for impaired driving in Canada – a criminal offence. 
 
Hence, the question: how safe are the Canadian skies? By deductive 
reasoning, it is apparent that the CARs tolerate working environments 
where a fatigued pilot is permitted to fly an aircraft at the same level of 
impairment where he or she would be prohibited under the Criminal 
Code of Canada from driving any motor vehicle. This deficient legal 
framework is inherently unsafe and puts the travelling public at risk. 
 
Furthermore, an analysis of the public decisions rendered by the 
Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada, the quasi-judicial body 
established to hear reviews and appeals relating to the Aeronautics Act 
and the CARs, reveals that, between 1989 and 2016, only four decisions 
have found either a pilot or an operator guilty of contravening FDT 
regulations in Canada.234 Hence, we must ask ourselves if the existence of 
very few cases in the last three decades documenting FDT contraventions 
is indicative of a safe aviation industry immune from pilot fatigue, or 
rather an illusion concealing Canada’s deficient and flawed oversight of 
FDT regulations. Whilst this data only highlights cases that were appealed 
to the Tribunal, one must also wonder if there is sufficient State oversight 
to catch offending parties who fly under the radar of Transport Canada 
and ignore FDT regulations. 
 
Needless to say, aside from publishing its NPA and promising to 
adopt new regulations, Canada has failed to uphold its commitment to the 
travelling public and ICAO by maintaining FDT standards that do not 
reflect the realities of modern aviation. In its struggle to reconcile safety 
and the economic pressures of the industry, Canada’s approach to pilot 
fatigue – namely its policies, their oversight and enforcement – is 
                                                 
234 102643 Aviation Ltd v Minister of Transport (15 June 2009), TATC File No W-3375-41, online: 
Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada <www.tatc.gc.ca/decision/decision.php?dc_id= 
1340&lang=eng>; Blair William Jensen v Minister of Transport (15 June 2009), TATC File No W-
3373-33, online: Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada <www.tatc.gc.ca/decision/ 
decision.php?dc_id=1339&lang=eng>; Minister of Transport v Frederick Olaf Martin (15 
October 1997), CAT File No O-1473-33, online: Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada 
<www.tatc.gc.ca/decision/decision.php?dc_id=620&lang=eng>; Minister of Transport v 
Peter George Dmytriw (15 October 1997), CAT File No O-1474-33, online: Transportation 
Appeal Tribunal of Canada <www.tatc.gc.ca/decision/decision.php?dc_id=621&lang= 
eng>. 
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conducive to the development of unsafe practices in the industry. 
Exacerbated by political factors unfavourable to radical changes in the law 
in the near future, “State Factors” currently distort Canada’s safety levels 
as far as pilot fatigue is concerned. 
 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Professor Dempsey has argued that no other industry has been 
more regulated with safety and economic intervention than civil 
aviation.235 Nonetheless, safety regulation possesses a cyclical nature and, 
unfortunately, its evolution is reactive rather than proactive.236 While the 
evolution of FDT regulations has stalled in Canada, 237  this article has 
illustrated how Transport Canada has fallen behind several countries that 
have adapted their FDT regulations to the realities of present-day 
commercial aviation and modern scientific data. 
 
Canada’s regulatory framework has several inherent deficiencies, 
mainly because of the enforcement of obsolete regulations. The US Federal 
Aviation Administration brought forward up-to-date FDT and FRMS 
regulations after the Colgan Air crash had caused tragic deaths of 50 
people.238 Will Canada complacently wait to modify its FDT regulations 
until a fully loaded airliner crashes due to pilot fatigue near a major city?239 
 
As Richard Johnstone asserts, the tragic loss of life is often the 
reactive trigger for necessary changes to the law, rather than 
implementing proactive changes before tragedies arise.240 If flight safety is 
not proactively regulated by Transport Canada with modern FDT 
regulations, it is axiomatic that the “invisible hand” of safety will tolerate 
negative externalities caused by the driving business goals of the 
commercial aviation industry, 241  thus allowing carriers to utilise their 
                                                 
235 Dempsey & Gesell, Public Policy, supra note 48 at 301. 
236 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against 
Terrorism” (2002-2003) 41:3 Colum J Transnat’l L 649 at 649. 
237 Evans-Davis, supra note 2 at 601: 
At the nebulous core of this standstill is the ever-present economic factor of revision 
and change. No one wants exhaustion and fatigue to be intrinsic job characteristics 
for pilots, but few people are thrilled with increasing airline operating costs by 
billions of dollars to implement more responsive fatigue solutions. 
238 See Cherry, supra note 4 at 551-52. 
239 See Quinlan, supra note 4 at 10; Johnstone, “Courts”, supra note 4 at 208–09; René David-
Cooper, “Don’t Drink and Drive, Smoke and Fly: A Clearance for Pilots to Get High?” (2014) 
XXXIX Ann Air & Sp L 555 at 576. 
240 Johnstone, “Courts”, supra note 4 at 217. 
241  See Paul Stephen Dempsey & Andrew R Goetz, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire 
Mythology (Westport, Conn: Quorum Books, 1992) at 301, 306; Johnstone, “Courts”, supra 
note 4 at 217. 
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fatigued pilots beyond sensible working hours, and putting the pilots and 
the travelling public at risk. If regulations are not amended, flight safety 
will be inevitably compromised at the mercy of the carriers’ business 
imperatives. 
 
At the time of this writing, Transport Canada has proposed new 
rules amending the CARs to combat pilot fatigue, with notable reductions 
in the number of hours a pilot can fly during any consecutive day or 
year. 242  However, promising regulatory changes is one thing; 
implementing them is an entirely different issue. While industry 
stakeholders have already expressed their opposition to these changes, we 
must avoid a tunnel vision approach and focus on broader issues in the 
industry, which have exacerbated the current pilot fatigue phenomenon 
in Canada. 
 
Although Canada retains a legal obligation to bring its domestic 
legislation in line with ICAO SARPs, pilot fatigue concerns also have deep 
roots within the aviation industry’s economic context. Therefore, the 
solution to pilot fatigue lies beyond elementary air safety considerations. 
Ever since the National Transportation Act of 1987 243  deregulated the 
airline market in Canada,244 many Canadian air carriers have struggled to 
carefully balance operational efficiency with safety concerns,245 such as 
pilot fatigue. While the objective of establishing an openly competitive 
market with new entrants has been achieved,246 airline deregulation has 
                                                 
242 Regulations Amending the Canadian Aviation Regulations (Parts I, VI and VII — Flight Crew 
Member Hours of Work and Rest Periods), Proposed regulations, (2017) C Gaz I, 2909, online: 
Canada Gazette <www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2017/2017-07-01/pdf/g1-15126.pdf>. “The 
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hours” depending on the time when a flight is scheduled to take off. See ibid at 2915. 
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period of time free from duty of 33 consecutive hours every 8 days, where the time free from 
duty would commence no later than 22:30 and end no earlier than 7:30. This mandated period 
of time free from duty would provide pilots with two sleep opportunities and, therefore, 
allow them to recover from the effects of cumulative fatigue. 
243  The National Transportation Act has since been repealed and replaced by the Canada 
Transportation Act, SC 1996, c 10. 
244 John Christopher & Joseph P Dion, “The Canadian Airline Industry”, 89-2E (revised 14 
November 2002), online: Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP 
/CIR/892-e.htm>. 
245 Dempsey & Gesell, Air Transportation, supra note 8 at 225. Deregulation has brought about 
cutthroat pricing, a miserable level of industry profitability, insufficient capital to re-equip 
aging fleets, and a deterioration of service. Since deregulation began, the airline industry has 
suffered the worst economic losses in its history. 
246 Laurence E Gesell, Airline Re-Regulation (Chandler, Ariz: Coast Aire Publications, 1990) at 
43; Timothy M Vowles & Michael Lück, “Chapter 4: Low Cost Carriers in the USA and 
Canada” in Sven Gross & Michael Lück, eds, The Low Cost Carrier Worldwide (London: 
Routledge, 2016). 
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induced destructive competition among carriers 247  and has brought a 
deleterious effect on airline safety.248 Intensive pricing wars have forced 
many operators around the world to adopt self-destructive practices to 
remain profitable, 249  such as curtailing operational expenditures at the 
expense of flight safety.250 To reduce overhead and halt the erosion in 
carrier profitability,251 labour costs, which account for 30 to 40% of an 
airline’s expenses,252 have been the primary target of airline managers.253 
As a result, lower salaries have forced many struggling pilots to work 
more and fly longer hours. 
 
With the entry of non-unionised carriers, deregulation sparked a 
serious labour crisis in aviation,254 which has still not fully subsided after 
nearly thirty years. While the NPA’s suggested amendments could 
potentially result in the increase of operational costs by up to 30%,255 it is 
difficult to imagine how cash-strapped carriers will embrace this 
“impractical” regulatory reform. 256  With airlines generating net profit 
margins hovering around 1%, 257  it is doubtful that passengers will be 
willing to absorb another increase in ticket prices. Realistically, pilots are 
more likely to personally stomach this financial impact, given that air 
carriers could indeed reduce their salaries as a result of these changes. The 
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author believes that amendments to FDT regulations will certainly 
improve the current situation, but will not provide a sustainable solution 
to modern pilot fatigue concerns. 
 
Unfortunately, it is now clear that financial difficulties triggered by 
deregulation 258  have negatively affected several safety aspects of 
commercial aviation, including pilot fatigue.259 The author considers that 
there is a strong correlation between pilot remuneration and pilot 
fatigue.260 It is not rare for some commercial pilots to earn a meagre CAD$ 
25,000 per annum in Canada after investing at least CAD$ 50,000 in their 
flight training.261 Many pilots are forced to fly demanding flight schedules 
or even take on secondary employment positions to survive above the 
poverty line. Improved FDT regulations reflecting modern science will 
likely afford pilots with reasonable work schedules and adequate rest 
periods, thus reducing pilot fatigue and optimising their flight 
performances. However, FDT regulations will not change the fact that civil 
aviation is still suffering from post-deregulation financial anaemia.262 We 
cannot ignore that reduced work schedules as a result of new FDT rules 
may result in reduced pay checks. Consequently, pilots might still be 
forced to work more hours in non-aviation positions to generate a 
reasonable salary, a practice which will defy the intrinsic purpose of FDT 
regulations and expose pilots to additional fatigue.263 
 
The regulator has ignored that pilot fatigue originates, in part, from 
the financial distress of some air carriers, which has forced many of these 
to hire inexperienced pilots and have them work beyond sensible hours in 
the early stages of their careers. We must, therefore, ask ourselves if 
increased economic regulation is the long-term solution to the negative 
safety externalities, 264  such as pilot fatigue, which have persisted in 
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Canada for many years.265 Indeed, we must come to grasp with the fact 
that economic deregulation has had the indirect effect of also deregulating 
certain aspects of flight safety.266 Moderate economic re-regulation is the 
only solution that would realistically enable the airline market to satisfy 
the public interest by accomplishing social goals, such as ensuring the 
travelling public’s safety and well-being, with the added assurance that 
commercial pilots are adequately paid and well rested. 267  Since safety 
cannot be separated from the economic health of airlines, 268 the safety 
benefits of FDT regulations can only be achieved if we pay more attention 
to the economic health of the aviation industry itself.269 
 
The State must not exclusively serve the dominant interests of the 
airline managers; “[i]t also has to respond to pressures from below to 
maintain the social conditions necessary for capitalist accumulation”270 by 
protecting its workforce. 271  If reintroducing economic regulation can 
temper market imperatives by eliminating the problems of imperfect 
competition, the industry will likely become more productive and 
efficient. As a result, pilot salaries could increase while preventing pilots 
from flying under onerous work schedules. 
 
Changes in the law are not always the answer to every problem. At 
times, legal solutions can be imperfect if they are implemented without 
tackling other contributory issues, such as the current self-serving 
practices adopted by some air carriers to manage pilot fatigue. As Richard 
Johnstone points out, more “regulatory legislation actually reinforces 
rather than challenges this conception of the market as an autonomous, 
self-regulating sphere”.272 It is time for Canada and other ICAO Member 
States to realise that the safety benefits pledged under Annex 6 can only 
be achieved if its implementation is combined with corresponding 
economic measures. 
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